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THE FTC WON’T LET ME BE:  THE NEED FOR A 
PRIVATE RIGHT OF ACTION UNDER 
SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Allison Hernandez is a recent law school graduate.1  Like the average 
graduate, Allison is burdened with a substantial amount of student loan 
debt.  One day, Allison received a call from a fake collector.  The caller 
assured Allison that they were affiliated with her student loan servicer 
and had the ability to decrease her student loans by seventy percent.  
Allison believed the caller and accepted the company’s services.  Allison 
promptly paid the company and expected to see her loans decrease 
dramatically.  After sending thousands of dollars making these payments, 
the contract was sold to a third party.  The third party did not pay Allison’s 
lenders.  Allison realized she had been deceived and demanded a refund, 
although to no avail. 
Allison initiated a lawsuit against the company to get her money back.  
She also requested an injunction against the company to eliminate any 
future scams against innocent victims.  Unfortunately, under Allison’s 
state’s consumer protection laws she cannot have an injunction issued 
against the company.2  Moreover, she cannot allege a Section 5 violation 
of the Federal Trade Commission Act (“FTC Act”), which prohibits the 
deceptive acts of companies, because she is a private consumer.3  Her only 
                                                 
1 This is a hypothetical situation that is solely the work of the author.  The facts of this 
hypothetical closely parallel the facts from FTC v. E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc.  767 F.3d 611, 621 
(6th Cir. 2014).  The defendants in E.M.A. Nationwide, Inc. created a scheme by which they 
had a series of American and Canadian corporations.  Id. at 619–20.  In order to effectuate the 
scheme, the corporations placed cold calls to struggling American consumers and made 
promises to consumers that were not kept.  Id. at 620.  The defendants would claim to be 
affiliated with the consumer’s creditors or that they were calling on behalf of the government 
in order to advance the scheme.  Id. at 621. 
2 See ARK. CODE ANN. § 4-88-104 (2016) (stating that the Arkansas Attorney General can 
have an injunction issued against the telemarketer per the Arkansas Deceptive Trade 
Practices Act (“ADTPA”), which would end the deceptive practice).  See also ABA SECTION 
OF ANTITRUST LAW, 2011 REVIEW OF CONSUMER PROTECTION LAW DEVELOPMENTS 259 (2011) 
[hereinafter 2011 REVIEW] (discussing private enforcement and remedies available to 
Arkansas consumers under the ADTPA).  Under the ADTPA, even though private litigants 
can seek money damages, injunctive relief is not available to them.  Id.  In Allison’s case, not 
having the option to have an injunction issued against the telemarketer may mean that the 
deceptive act or practice could continue. 
3 See infra Part II.C (explaining the Holloway Court’s interpretation of congressional intent 
regarding a private right of action under the FTC Act and examining the history of the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 5 of the FTC Act in Moore v. New York Cotton 
Exchange); Holloway set the precedent that a private right of action does not exist for 
consumers under the FTC Act.  Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 
1973). 
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option is to file an informal complaint with the Federal Trade Commission 
(“FTC”) with the hope that the FTC commissioners will issue an injunction 
against the company to stop the company’s deceptive practices.4 
Section 5 of the FTC Act protects American consumers from deceptive 
acts or practices in or affecting commerce.5  Since the FTC Act’s creation, 
consumers have not been able to initiate lawsuits alleging Section 5 
violations, due largely in part to the judicial interpretation in Holloway v. 
Bristol-Myers Corporation.6  Currently, state consumer protection laws do 
not contain the broad enforcement provisions of Section 5, as a result, 
consumers are left without adequate protection as illustrated in Allison’s 
case.7 
                                                 
4 See infra Part II.A (listing the steps that a consumer needs to take in order to submit a 
complaint with the FTC).  In order to submit a complaint with the FTC, Allison has the option 
of logging on to the FTC’s website and answering a list of questions regarding the act or 
practice that occurred.  See FTC, Submit a Consumer Complaint to the FTC, http://www.ftc. 
gov/faq/consumer-protection/submit-consumer-complaint-ftc [https://perma.cc/632Y-
D9TU] (illustrating the methods for a consumer to file a complaint, such as logging on to the 
FTC complaint assistant). 
5 See 15 U.S.C § 45(a)(1) (2012) (“Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, 
and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby declared 
unlawful.”); see also infra Part II.A (describing Section 5 of the FTC Act, providing the legal 
history of the Act, and congressional intent for enacting Section 5). 
6 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 989 (holding that consumers are not afforded a private right of 
action under the FTC Act); United States v. J.B. Williams Co., Inc., 498 F.2d 414, 463 (2d Cir. 
1974) (holding that the FTC is in the best position to determine penalties for violating a cease 
and desist order, while citing to Holloway’s decision multiple times throughout its reasoning).  
See also Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582, 586 (N.D. Ind. 1976) (arguing 
that federal courts, using Holloway as reasoning, have historically found that no private right 
of action could be implied from the FTC Act).  Conversely, Guernsey ultimately held that the 
plaintiffs adequately stated a claim under 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) and had a cause of action.  Id. 
at 589.  Guernsey analyzed Holloway’s decision and determined that the government cannot 
possibly protect all consumers from ongoing fraud.  Id. at 586.  The court argued that unlike 
Holloway the plaintiff had established a claim for which relief could be granted.  Id. at 588–
89.  The private right of action found by Guernsey is only available when the wrongful 
conduct is subject to an earlier cease and desist order issued by the FTC.  Days Inn of Am. 
Franchising, Inc. v. Windham, 699 F. Supp. 1581, 1583 (N.D. Ga. 1988). 
7 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the effects of not having a private right of action on 
consumers based on the discrepancies between state and federal consumer protection law); 
see also John E. Villafranco & Daniel S. Blynn, The Case of the Piggyback Class Action in a 
“Piggyback” Class Action Lawsuit, Who Bears the Burden of Proving Falsity?, NUTRITIONAL 
OUTLOOK 22, 24 (2012) (arguing that because there is no private right of action under the FTC 
Act, any class action brought before the court by a private litigant relying on allegations 
made by the FTC in a previous action is impermissible); infra Part II.B (demonstrating that 
state consumer protection laws are based off of the FTC Act, and that Section 5 enforcement 
is broader than most state consumer protection laws). 
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To provide a private right of action, this Note proposes an amendment 
to Section 5 of the FTC Act to resolve the issue for consumers.8  First, Part 
II discusses the FTC Act, Section 5 and its current regulations, as well as, 
who is protected by the FTC Act.9  Then, Part III analyzes Section 5’s 
problems and why a private right of action is needed under Section 5 
based on Holloway.10  Finally, Part IV proposes an amendment to Section 
5 and suggests that Congress implement the phrase “private consumer-
plaintiff” into the FTC Act.11  These amendments will provide adequate 
consumer redress, and ultimately, result in stronger consumer protection 
law to resolve the problem of not having a private right of action under 
Section 5.12 
II.  BACKGROUND 
The question of whether federal courts may recognize private rights 
of action in the face of legislative silence is “one of the most contentious 
and practically important debates about judicial authority in the 
administrative state.”13  The U.S. Supreme Court’s ruling in Moore v. New 
York Cotton Exchange brought the issue of whether consumers have the 
                                                 
8 See infra Part IV (introducing the proposed changed to 15 U.S.C. § 45 and suggesting 
that by adding the phrase “consumer-plaintiff” throughout the existing language, consumers 
will be afforded the same express right of action available to the FTC to file a claim against a 
Section 5 violator).  The range of the problem extends to consumers across the United States 
and it is not an issue that one state can correct, but calls for a change in federal legislation.  
Infra Part IV. 
9 See infra Part II.A–C (illustrating the components of the creation of the FTC Act, Section 
5 of the FTC Act, the reasons for enacting both pieces of federal consumer protection 
legislation, and the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”)). 
10 See infra Part III.A (analyzing the discrepancies between state and federal consumer 
protection law, how the differences have an impact on consumer protection, and concluding 
that as a result of the differences, consumers should be afforded an express private right of 
action under Section 5); see also infra Part III.B (examining why the holding in Holloway is 
incorrect based on the lack of application of all of the factors for implying a private right of 
action, and the improper analysis of determining congressional intent for not overturning 
the Moore decision). 
11 See infra Part IV (suggesting an amendment to the FTC Act that would reconcile 
consumer protection deficiencies based on the broad protection that is afforded to the FTC 
under the FTC Act, and also providing commentary about the proposed amendment and 
suggesting arguments that critics may make about the change to the federal consumer 
protection legislation). 
12 See infra Part III (examining the discrepancies between state and federal consumer 
protection law and how consumers are left without adequate redress due to not being 
afforded the same broad enforcement discretion that is available to the FTC). 
13 See Seth Davis, Implied Public Rights of Action, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 3 (2014) (arguing 
that the United States and the states regularly claim a right to judicial relief or a particular 
remedy that is not mandated by a statute or the Constitution, and thus, a discussion on 
implied public rights of action is needed). 
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ability to initiate a lawsuit under the FTC Act to the forefront of consumer 
protection law by determining that consumers are not able to initiate a 
lawsuit against the perpetrator of a crime prohibited under the FTC Act.14  
Years after Moore, federal courts have heard the issue of whether a private 
right of action can be implied from the congressional intent creating the 
FTC Act.15  Ultimately, federal courts have determined that consumers are 
not afforded the right to initiate a lawsuit against a violator of the FTC 
Act.16  This Note focuses on why consumers should be able to initiate a 
lawsuit against a violator of Section 5 based on the discrepancies between 
state and federal consumer protection law and the federal courts’ 
reasoning for not implying a private right of action.17 
First, Part II.A explains the components of federal consumer 
protection legislation, including Section 5 of the FTC Act and the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”).18  Then, Part II.B 
assesses private rights of action and introduces state laws, specifically 
“Little FTC Acts,” Uniform Deceptive Acts and Practices (“UDAP”) laws, 
and addresses the current effects that a private right of action has on 
consumers.19  Finally, Part II.C provides an overview of how courts 
interpret a private right of action under Section 5 and the Wheeler-Lea 
Amendments (“WLA”).20 
                                                 
14 See Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 603 (1926) (establishing the precedent that 
private litigants do not have the authority to initiate a lawsuit under the FTC Act based on 
the idea that consumer relief must be afforded by the FTC). 
15 See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that 
consumers are not afforded a private right of action under Section 5 because a private right 
cannot be implied under the FTC Act, and because Congress did not overturn the Moore 
decision, Congress intended enforcement of Section 5 to rest exclusively with the FTC). 
16 See id. at 987 (stating that consumers are not afforded a private right of action under the 
FTC Act); see also supra note 6 and accompanying text (providing a list of federal decisions 
that have followed Holloway’s precedent). 
17 See infra Part III.A (examining the differences between state and federal consumer 
protection law and concluding that as a result of the FTC’s broad discretion to enforce Section 
5 and the consumers’ ability to enforce a laundry list of practices under state consumer 
protection laws, the FTC Act should provide an express private right of action to consumers); 
see also infra Part III.B (assessing Holloway’s decision and finding that as a result of the court 
incorrectly balancing the five factors for implying a private right of action and erring in 
interpreting Congress’ intent for not overturning the Moore decision, the court reached the 
wrong result in finding that a private right of action did not exist under Section 5). 
18 See infra Part II.A (highlighting what the FTC is, whom it affects, Section 5 of the FTC 
Act, current tests under the FTC Act, and the CFPB). 
19 See infra Part II.B (explaining what a private right of action is and describing state 
consumer protection legislation based off of the FTC Act). 
20 See infra Part II.C (focusing on the relevant facts, legal history, and factors examined in 
Holloway and Guernsey). 
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A. Federal Consumer Protection Legislation 
The FTC is the federal agency responsible for safeguarding 
consumers.21  In 1914, the FTC Act established the FTC as an independent 
administrative agency composed of five commissioners appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate.22  The purpose of creating the FTC 
was to prevent unfair methods of competition due in part to an increase 
of monopolies.23  As a result, the FTC is empowered to prevent unfair 
methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices.24  The 
FTC Act applies to all persons, partnerships, and corporations.25  Congress 
also granted the FTC the power to conduct investigations of possible 
violations of foreign antitrust laws.26  Further, the FTC is authorized to 
                                                 
21 See Villafranco & Blynn, supra note 7, at 22 (discussing the FTC’s role in consumer 
protection enforcement).  See also II ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, MONOGRAPH 5, THE FTC AS AN 
ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGENCY:  ITS STRUCTURE, POWERS AND PROCEDURES 3 (1981) 
[hereinafter ANTITRUST SECTION, VOL. II] (noting that the FTC also is authorized to gather 
information from businesses, make reports to the public and Congress, and recommend 
legislation).  As part of its role in consumer protection, the FTC is able to conduct 
investigations consistent to the provisions of the FTC Act, and can prescribe rules and 
general statements of policy, as well as enforce compliance with Sections 2, 3, 7, and 8 of the 
Clayton Act.  Id. 
22 See ANTITRUST SECTION, VOL. II, supra note 21, at 3 (noting that the presidentially 
appointed commissioners are empowered to prevent unfair methods of competition and 
deceptive acts or practices).  See also ROBERT V. LABAREE, THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION:  
A GUIDE TO SOURCES 423 (Garland Publishing 423 Inc., 2000) (defining the duties of each of 
the commissioners).  The first appointed commissioners continued in office for terms of 
three, four, five, six, and seven years, respectively.  Id.  The President designated the 
commissioners’ terms.  Id.  Currently, however, commissioners are appointed for seven years 
unless the commissioner is appointed to fill a vacancy.  Id.  If the commissioner is appointed 
to fill a vacancy, he or she will serve only for the unexpired terms of the commissioner who 
he or she succeeded.  Id. 
23 See FTC, About the FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc [http://perma.cc/XTG5-
AGPM] (providing the legal history of the FTC).  See also Todd H. Cohen, Double Vision:  The 
FTC, State Regulation, and Deciding What’s Best for Consumers, 59 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1249, 
1251 (1991) (describing the history of the FTC Act).  Congress enacted the FTC Act as a 
response to an increase of monopolies and unsuccessful attempts of enforcing the Sherman 
Act.  Id. 
24 See ANTITRUST SECTION, VOL. II, supra note 21, at 3 (reviewing the role of the 
commissioners).  Additionally, commissioners have the ability to gather information from 
businesses and report to the public and Congress.  Id.  See also Cohen, supra note 23, at 1251 
(noting that Section 5(a)(2) of the FTC Act permits the FTC the ability to prevent unfair or 
deceptive acts). 
25 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012) (listing the components of the FTC Act).  The FTC has the 
ability to require that persons, partnerships, and corporations engaged in commercial 
business submit reports annually.  Id. § 46(b). 
26 See id. § 46(i) (affirming that the FTC has the ability to conduct investigations of possible 
violations of foreign antitrust laws).  Under the FTC Act, the FTC has the ability to conduct 
investigations that are defined in Section 12 of 15 U.S.C. § 6211.  Id.  Additionally, the FTC 
Act gives the FTC authority to investigate trade conditions in and with foreign countries that 
Kroeze: The FTC Won't Let Me Be:  The Need for a Private Right of Action
Produced by The Berkeley Electronic Press, 2015
232 VALPARAISO UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 50 
investigate, initiate complaints, adjudicate violations, and create 
remedies.27 
In 1914, Congress passed the Clayton Act, with the purpose of 
protecting consumers from powerful producers and to preserve the 
freedom of economic opportunity.28  As a result of the FTC Act, if an FTC 
commissioner believes that a violation of Section 5 of the FTC Act or 
Sections 2, 3, 7, or 8 of the Clayton Act occurred, he or she can investigate 
the claim, file a complaint, conduct administrative hearings, or issue cease 
                                                 
may affect the foreign trade of the United States, and to report any recommendations to 
Congress.  Id. § 46(h).  See also 15 U.S.C. § 6211 (2012) (defining foreign antitrust conduct that 
the FTC has the ability to regulate); Makan Delarhim, Drawing the Boundaries of the Sherman 
Act:  Recent Developments in the Application of the Antitrust Laws to Foreign Conduct, 61 N.Y.U. 
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 415, 417 (2005) (expounding on the idea that the Supreme Court 
determined that the Sherman Act applied to foreign conduct intended to produce, and 
actually produced, a substantial effect in the United States).  The statute states “[t]he term 
‘foreign antitrust laws’ means that the laws of a foreign state, or of a regional economic 
integration organization, that are substantially similar to any of the Federal antitrust laws 
and that prohibit conduct similar to conduct prohibited under the Federal antitrust laws.”  
15 U.S.C. § 6211(7); see also 15 U.S.C. § 45(4)(A) (providing statutory authority for the types 
of foreign commerce that the FTC has the ability to regulate under the FTC Act).  The FTC 
has the ability to regulate deceptive acts or practices, including “acts or practices involving 
foreign commerce that cause, or are likely to cause, reasonably foreseeable injury within the 
United States.”  15 U.S.C. § 45(4)(A)(i)–(ii)  Additionally the FTC may regulate deceptive acts 
that involve material conduct occurring within the United States.  Id. 
27 See ANTITRUST SECTION, VOL. II, supra note 21, at 3 (highlighting the structure and 
organization of the FTC).  The authority granted to the FTC through the FTC Act is the subject 
of controversy to legal commentators.  See Andy J. Miller, A Procedural Approach to “Unfair 
Methods of Competition”, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1485, 1488 (2008) (arguing that the FTC took it upon 
itself to determine whether a broad interpretation of Section 5 should or should not be used).  
The controversy is due to the fact that the FTC has the sole authority to determine what 
constitutes a deceptive act or practice and what a violation of the FTC Act is.  Id.  See also 
Diana Gillis, Closing an Administrative Loophole:  Ethics for the Administrative Judiciary, 31 J. 
NAT’L ASS’N ADMIN. L. JUDICIARY 149, 150 (2011) (reiterating the fact that the FTC must 
comply with the Administrative Procedure Act during its adjudication process).  In 2008, the 
FTC issued a complaint against a health company challenging an acquisition that was 
occurring.  Id.  During the adjudication process, the FTC did not go through an 
administrative law judge (“ALJ”), but instead appointed FTC Commissioner Rosch, to serve 
as the ALJ over the matter.  Id.  The Administrative Procedure Act gave Commissioner Rosch 
authority to oversee the adjudication; however, commissioner adjudication is rare because 
the process normally occurs before an ALJ.  Id.  Legal commentators raised ethical concerns 
about the FTC’s ability to adjudicate its own complaints because the FTC may rule in its own 
favor, whereas, an unbiased ALJ may rule against the FTC.  Id. at 151–54. 
28 See Andrew Zuckerman, Standing of Targets of Hostile Takeovers to Enjoin their Acquisition 
on Antitrust Grounds, 1992/1993 ANN. SURV. AM. L. 447, 451 (1993) (describing the reasoning 
for enacting the Clayton Act in 1914).  Congress passed the Clayton Act as a response to the 
ineffectiveness of the Sherman Act.  Id.  See also ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, FTC 
PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE MANUAL 23–26 (2d ed., 2014) [hereinafter FTC MANUAL] 
(elaborating in detail the four sections of the Clayton Act that the FTC Commissioners have 
the responsibility of enforcing). 
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and desist orders.29  Section 2 of the Clayton Act prohibits certain forms of 
price discrimination, which occur when a seller charges different prices to 
different consumers for the same good or services based on their 
willingness to pay.30  Section 3 of the Clayton Act is typically applied to 
exclusive dealing prices, and tying, which occurs when a seller sells one 
product on the condition that the buyer purchases a second, tied, 
product.31  Further, Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits mergers and 
acquisitions that result in creating a monopoly or substantially lessens 
competition.32  Finally, Section 8 of the Clayton Act deters representatives 
of corporations from conspiring together to restrict trade.33 
                                                 
29 See ANTITRUST SECTION, VOL. II, supra note 21, at 3 (discussing the statutory framework 
that governs the FTC).  In 1973, the Alaska Pipeline Act was passed, which gave the FTC the 
authority to seek injunctions in federal court.  Id.  See also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, 
MONOGRAPH NO. 5, THE FTC AS AN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT AGENCY:  THE ROLE OF 
SECTION 5 OF THE FTC ACT IN ANTITRUST LAW 1 (1981) [hereinafter ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, 
VOL. I] (describing the methods that the FTC relies on when enforcing Section 5). 
30 See FTC MANUAL, supra note 28, at 23–24 (listing the factors of a Section 2 of the Clayton 
Act violation, the legal history of Section 2, and enforcement methods that the FTC can 
employ to prohibit violations).  Section 2 of the Clayton Act was amended by the Robinson-
Patman Act and prohibits certain forms of price discrimination.  Id. at 23.  The Robinson-
Patman Act precludes a seller from price discrimination between buyers of goods of similar 
quality and grade when a substantial competitive injury might occur.  Id.  Thus, one of the 
basic provisions of Section 2 of the Clayton Act is that a seller is prohibited from 
discriminating in price between buyers when the discrimination would adversely impact 
competition.  Id.  See Mathew A. Edwards, Price and Prejudice:  The Case Against Consumer 
Equality in the Information Age, 10 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 559, 560 (2006) (describing the theory 
of price discrimination).  Critics argue that due to the technological advances and changes in 
markets for consumer goods and services, price discrimination has increased greatly in 
recent years.  Id. 
31 See FTC MANUAL, supra note 28, at 24 (discussing the history of Section 3 of the Clayton 
Act).  Section 3 of the Clayton Act is applied to tying and tied products in the categories of 
merchandise, supplies, wares, or goods.  Id.  Section 3 of the Clayton Act prohibits the sale 
or lease of these items under the condition or understanding that the purchaser or lessee 
refrains from dealing with competitors, if the agreement substantially lessens competition.  
Id.  Section 5 of the FTC Act actions can be brought if intangibles such as services are involved 
in tying or exclusive dealing practices.  Id.  If there is a tying arrangement under Section 3 of 
the Clayton Act or Section 5 of the FTC Act, the analysis for examining the arrangement is 
the same.  Id. 
32 See id. at 24–25 (describing the components of Section 7 of the Clayton Act, what it 
applies to, and the type of relief afforded if an action is brought under Section 7).  Section 7 
of the Clayton Act is equally applicable to mergers and to acquisitions, even if the 
acquisitions involve assets or stocks.  FTC MANUAL, supra note 28, at 24–25.  Section 7 has 
been applied to horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers.  Id. at 25.  Additionally, the 
FTC Act limits the FTC’s ability to enforce Section 7A of the Clayton Act, meaning that the 
FTC cannot extend its jurisdiction to Section 7A.  Id.  The FTC’s jurisdictional limits under 
the FTC Act state that the FTC cannot enforce Section 7A of the Clayton Act against “common 
carriers subject to the Acts which regulate commerce.”  Id. 
33 See id. at 25–26 (describing Section 8 of the Clayton Act, the type of behavior that it 
prohibits, and the type of relief that is available to the FTC for a violation of Section 8).  
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If a respondent to an FTC action elects to settle the charges against 
him, the respondent can sign a consent agreement without admitting 
liability and waive all right to judicial review.34  Complaints will be 
adjudicated before an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) or in front of the 
FTC, if the respondent chooses to dispute the charges.35  If the FTC or the 
ALJ determines that a practice is unfair or deceptive and has issued a final 
cease and desist order, then the FTC can obtain civil penalties from non-
respondents who subsequently violate the set standards.36 
Any person who violates one of the FTC’s trade regulation rules with 
actual knowledge, or knowledge that can be implied based on objective 
circumstances, is liable for civil penalties of up to $11,000 per violation, 
provided the act is unfair or deceptive.37  To obtain civil penalties, or 
                                                 
Specifically, Section 8 placed limitations on a person who serves as a director or board-
elected or appointed officer of two or more corporations.  Id. at 25.  The primary purpose of 
Section 8 was to prohibit conspiracies restricting trade through the control of a common 
board.  FTC MANUAL, supra note 28, at 25–26.  One could be found liable of violating Section 
8 of the Clayton Act if they are a representative of two corporations that have subsidiaries 
that compete—even if the main corporations are not in competition with each other.  Id. at 
26. 
34 See What We Do, A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s Investigative and Law 
Enforcement Authority, FTC II.A.1.(a) (July 2008), http://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-
do/enforcement-authority [http://perma.cc/2RAY-EQHF] [hereinafter A Brief Overview] 
(listing the adjudication procedures within the FTC’s administrative process). 
35 See id. (clarifying the procedures for judicial enforcement of the FTC Act).  Sixty days 
after an FTC Order is served, it becomes final and binding on the respondent, unless stayed 
by the FTC or by a reviewing court.  Id.  See supra note 27 and accompanying text (describing 
the FTC’s powers when adjudicating disputes and the ethical questions raised by this 
process). 
36 See A Brief Overview, supra note 34, at II.A.1(a) (noting that in order to gain civil 
penalties, the FTC will need to prove that the violator had “actual knowledge that such act 
or practice is unfair or deceptive and is unlawful under Section 5(a)(1) of the FTC Act”).  See 
also Federal Trade Commission, FTC Takes Action Against Two Auto Dealership Chains for 
Violating 2012 Orders Prohibiting Deceptive Advertising of Vehicle Costs (Dec. 12, 2014), 
http://www.ftc.gov/news-events/press-releases/2014/12/ftc-takes-action-against-two-
auto-dealership-chains-violating [http://perma.cc/2EUZ-FKBP] (reviewing the civil 
penalties obtained for a violation of an FTC’s order).  In 2012, an FTC order prohibited Billion 
Auto, an automobile dealership located in Iowa, Montana, and South Dakota, from 
misrepresenting material costs and terms of vehicle financing lease and offers pursuant to 
the Truth in Lending Act and the Consumer Leasing Act.  Id.  Billion Auto violated the order 
by focusing on a few attractive terms in its advertisements.  Id.  As a result of this violation, 
Billion Auto settled with the FTC in 2014, and agreed to pay $360,000 worth of civil penalties.  
Id. 
37 See A Brief Overview, supra note 34, at II.A.1(a) (describing civil penalty enforcement 
methods for any person who violates one of the FTC’s promulgated trade regulations).  
When seeking civil penalties, the FTC will file a suit in district court under Section 5(m)(1)(A) 
of the FTC Act.  Id.  See also 15 U.S.C. § 45(l) (2012) (providing statutory authority for the 
FTC’s ability to receive a penalty for a violation of its order).  The statute states: 
Any person, partnership, or corporation who violates an order of the 
Commission after it has become final, and while such order is in effect, 
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consumer compensation for violations, the FTC must seek the aid of a 
court.38  Under the FTC Act, any person who violates a rule promulgated 
by the FTC, regardless of the state of their knowledge, is liable for the 
injury.39  The FTC relies on permanent injunctions to challenge cases of 
basic consumer fraud and deception.40  Finally, the FTC can impose 
monetary equitable relief to remedy past violations.41 
Section 5 of the FTC Act is a federal law specifically prohibiting unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices and unfair methods of competition.42  
                                                 
shall forfeit and pay to the United States a civil penalty of not more than 
$10,000 for each violation, which shall accrue to the United States and 
may be recovered in a civil action brought by the Attorney General of 
the United States[.] 
Id. 
38 See A Brief Overview, supra note 34, at II.A.2 (illustrating the FTC’s methods for seeking 
the aid of the court).  See also Gary Lawson, The Rise and Fall of the Administrative State, 107 
HARV. L. REV. 1231, 1248 (1994) (arguing that the power given to administrative agencies 
conflicts with the Constitution).  After the FTC administers a complaint, the behavior is 
prosecuted and adjudicated by the FTC.  Id.  Additionally, the FTC has the ability to choose 
to adjudicate before an ALJ rather than the FTC and if the ALJ finds for the respondent, the 
FTC can appeal to the Commission.  Id.  Then, if the FTC finds for the FTC after the appeal, 
the respondent can appeal to an Article III Court.  Id.  Finally, before the Article III Court, the 
FTC possesses “a very strong presumption of correctness on matters of both fact and law.”  
Id. at 1248–49. 
39 See A Brief Overview, supra note 34, at II.A.1(a) (describing civil penalty enforcement 
methods for any person who violates one of the FTC’s promulgated trade regulations).  See 
also 15 U.S.C. § 45(m)(1)(B) (elaborating on the penalties for a violation of a cease and desist 
order).  A defendant must have actual knowledge that he is in violation of Section 5 when 
the FTC imposes penalties on him for violation of an order.  Id. § 45(m)(1)(B)(2). 
40 See A Brief Overview, supra note 34, at II.A.2 (noting that the FTC is able to use injunctions 
to enforce the FTC Act’s provisions).  See also Peter C. Ward, Restitution for Consumers Under 
the Federal Trade Commission Act:  Good Intentions or Congressional Intentions?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 
1139, 1184 (1992) (discussing judicial construction of Section 13(b) of the FTC Act).  Section 
13(b) of the FTC Act permits the FTC to seek preliminary and permanent injunctions.  Id. at 
1184–85.  When the FTC first began issuing injunctions, an early issue was whether an order 
could include a freeze on the respondent’s assets.  Id. at 1185.  The Fifth Circuit answered 
this question first in FTC v. Southwest Sunsites, Inc. and determined that the FTC could freeze 
assets because the relief was necessary to ensure that consumers would receive effective 
redress.  Id. 
41 See Ward, supra note 40, at 1143 (introducing the FTC’s methods for obtaining equitable 
relief).  Equitable relief from the FTC includes restitution and recession of bad agreements.  
Id.  Courts also permitted the appointment of a receiver to grant ancillary equitable relief.  Id. 
at 1143 n.19 (citing FTC v. Oil & Gas Corp., 748 F.2d 1431, 1432 (11th Cir. 1984)) (upholding 
the FTC’s power to grant equitable relief). 
42 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a) (2012) (providing the statutory authority for Section 5).  The statute 
states: 
(1) Unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce, and unfair 
or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce, are hereby 
declared unlawful.  (2) The Commission is hereby empowered and 
directed to prevent persons, partnerships, or corporations, except banks, 
saving loan institutions described in section 57a(f)(3) of this 
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President Wilson signed Section 5 into law on September 26, 1914, to 
provide the FTC with more flexible administrative authority.43  Current 
regulations under Section 5 provide that an unfair act is one that causes, 
or is likely to cause:  (1) substantial injury to consumers; (2) cannot be 
reasonably avoided by consumers; and (3) is not outweighed by 
countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.44  By contrast, a 
deceptive act occurs where a representation, omission, or practice 
misleads the consumer, the consumer interprets the characteristic in a 
reasonable manner, and the misleading characteristic is material.45 
                                                 
title . . . from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting 
commerce and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in or affecting 
commerce. 
Id. § 45(a)(1)–(2); see also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, VOL. I, supra note 29, at 3 (discussing the 
legal history of the FTC Act); Royce Zeisler, Chevron Deference and the FTC:  How and Why the 
FTC Should Use Chevron to Improve Antitrust Enforcement, 2014 COLUM. BUS. L. REV. 266, 271–
72 (2014) (describing the legal history of the FTC Act).  Antitrust enforcement was uncertain 
after the passing of the Sherman Act, and the Act’s perceived failure directly led Congress to 
passing the FTC Act and the Clayton Act.  Zeisler, supra note 42, at 271–72. 
43 See James J. O’Connell, Section 5, 1914, and the FTC at 100, 29 ANTITRUST 5, 5 (2014) 
(providing the legal history of the FTC Act); Ruth Barber Timm, The Intraenterprise Conspiracy 
Doctrine and the Pharmaceutical Benefit Management Industry:  A Proposed Exception to the 
Copperweld Holding, 31 VAL. U. L. REV. 309, 314 (1996) (noting that the FTC Act contains broad 
language, which permits the FTC to prohibit a substantial amount of anticompetitive 
activity).  See also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, VOL. I, supra note 29, at 8–9, 11 (providing a 
historical perspective on the legislation that created the FTC).  Representative Raymond 
Stevens proposed the idea of having the commission monitor “unfair and oppressive” 
competition.  Id.  Representative Stevens’ proposal was based off of a legislation proposal 
called the Covington Bill.  Id.  The Covington Bill did not contain any reference to unfair 
competition, but it was based off of conduct that was deemed to be unreasonable within the 
interpretation of the Sherman Act.  Id.  In a minority report, Representative Stevens 
recognized the issues inherent in his proposal by stating:  “[I have] not attempted to define 
unfair or oppressive competition.  That is a question of fact to be decided by the commission 
the same way that the Interstate Commerce Commission decides what rates and practices of 
the railroads are unreasonable and unfair.”  Id.  Despite these issues, Representative Stevens’ 
proposal was the basis for Section 5 of the FTC Act.  Id. at 11. 
44 See Federal Trade Commission Act Section 5:  Unfair or Deceptive Acts or Practices, FED. 
RESERVE 1, http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/supmanual/cch/ftca.pdf 
[http://perma.cc/NT8W-ALAL] [hereinafter Federal Trade Commission Act] (noting a three-
part test to determine whether a representation, omission, or practice is “deceptive”). 
45 Id.  In applying the three-part test for deceptiveness, the FTC considers the overall effect 
of the advertisement or market statement.  Id.  See also Jon Mize, Fencing off the Path of Least 
Resistance:  Re-Examining the Role of Little FTC Act Actions in the Law of False Advertising, 72 
TENN. L. REV. 653, 657 (2005) (describing the elements of a FTC Act Action as applied to false 
advertising).  Additionally, the FTC considers what claims are conveyed in the 
advertisement, whether those claims are false or misleading, and whether those claims are 
material to prospective consumers.  Id.  Notably, the FTC does not need to show that the 
defendant in an FTC Act action did not intend to deceive consumers, that the defendant 
made a false statement, or that an injury occurred by the act.  Id. at 657–58. 
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If a violation of the FTC Act is found, an examiner should consider 
whether other statutory violations have occurred.46  The FTC has the 
burden to prove the act was deceptive and was reasonably relied upon.47  
Finally, Section 5 not only directly protects consumers, but also protects 
the competitive system by prohibiting certain unfair methods of 
competition.48 
Congress provided broad and flexible authority to the FTC to ensure 
that society was protected against oppressive anticompetitive conduct.49  
Congress crafted the FTC to enforce Section 5 as a more flexible 
standard—meaning the FTC obtained the ability to prohibit emerging 
violations that were not yet defined as unfair or deceptive.50  Currently, 
                                                 
46 See The Federal Trade Commission, supra note 44, at 1 (stating that if a possible violation 
of the FTC Act is found, the examiner should consider whether other statutory or regulatory 
violations have occurred).  See also Federal Reserve Examination Procedures, FEDERAL RESERVE 
2 (2008), http://www.federalreserve.gov/boarddocs/caletters/2007/0708/07-
08_attachment.pdf [http://perma.cc/4Y6G-WFL8] [hereinafter Federal Reserve] (listing 
specific practices that violate both Section 5 and other federal and state laws).  If the 
commissioners find a potential unfair or deceptive act, they should be mindful of other 
violations to similar laws such as the Truth in Lending and Truth in Saving Act, Equal Credit 
Opportunity and Fair Housing Acts, and Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.  Id. at 13–14. 
47 See F.T.C. v. QT, Inc., 512 F.3d 858, 861 (7th Cir. 2008) (determining that the FTC Act 
differs from the Food and Drug Act because the burden falls to the FTC to prove that 
statements are false).  See also Federal Reserve, supra note 46, at 11–12 (outlining the analysis 
that the FTC uses to determine whether an act is unfair or deceptive).  When determining 
whether an act is deceptive, a three-part test is used.  Id. at 12.  First, the representation, 
omission, or practice must mislead the consumer.  Id.  Second, the consumer’s understanding 
of the act must be deemed reasonable in light of the circumstances.  Id.  Third, the misleading 
act must be found to be material.  Id. 
48 See ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, VOL. I, supra note 29, at 1 (arguing that the FTC has a dual 
role in consumer protection because it directly protects consumers, but it also benefits 
consumers by protecting the competitive system).  Prohibiting unfair methods of 
competition results in the distribution of resources that would be found in a freely 
competitive market.  Id.  It is difficult to draw the line between the FTC’s role in consumer 
protection and protecting the competitive system.  Id. 
49 See Richard Dagen, Rambus, Innovation Efficiency, and Section 5 of the FTC Act, 90 B.U. L. 
REV. 1479, 1503 (2010) (describing the legal history and reach of Section 5).  The Supreme 
Court held in Sperry v. Hutchinson Company that Section 5 permits the FTC to define and 
proscribe an unfair competitive practice, even though the practice does not violate antitrust 
laws.  Id.  See also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, VOL. I, supra note 29, at 11 (discussing the 
legislative history of Section 5).  Congress recognized that new types of unfair-competition 
might occur and decided to deal with the problem flexibly.  Id. at 14.  It is essentially 
impossible to adopt “any single formulation as to the intended limits or methods of Section 
5.”  Id. at 14–15.  Thus, the scope of unfair methods of competition is considered to be broad 
and has been referred to as covering every new condition that may be invented.  Id. at 15. 
50 See Adam Speegle, Antitrust Rulemaking as a Solution to Abuse of the Standard-Setting 
Process, 110 MICH. L. REV. 847, 857 (2011) (analyzing FTC v. Motion Picture Advertising Service 
Company).  The case states: 
It is . . . clear that the Federal Trade Commission Act was designed to 
supplement and bolster the Sherman Act and the Clayton Act—to stop 
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the FTC has the sole authority to enforce it.51  Under Section 5, it has been 
implied that the FTC can enforce more than unfair or deceptive methods 
of competition, such as using its authority to prohibit behavior that 
violates antitrust laws.52  Additionally, it has been argued that the FTC has 
the power to enjoin unfair methods of competition conduct—violations 
that the antitrust laws cannot reach.53  Further, it has been suggested that 
the FTC can prohibit conduct that does not violate antitrust laws, but may 
choose to prosecute pure Section 5 violations.54  Finally, under Section 57 
                                                 
in their incipiency acts and practices which, when full blown, would 
violate those Acts, as well as to condemn as “unfair methods of 
competition” existing violations of them. 
Id. at 857–58 n.75 (internal citations omitted).  Congress created and adopted the Sherman 
Act in 1890 due to a reaction to the power and wealth increasingly aggregated in large trusts.  
Id. at 854.  Consisting of two basic components, the first component of the Sherman Act 
prohibits combinations or conspiracies restraining trade, while the second component 
prohibits monopolies.  Id.  The Clayton Act provides private rights of actions for treble 
damages and equitable relief by any person who is injured by an act that violates antitrust 
laws.  Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 990 (D.C. Cir. 1973).  The Department 
of Justice files complaints in a federal district court to enforce the Sherman and Clayton Acts, 
although the FTC also has the authority to enforce the Clayton Act.  Id. 
51 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(2) (2012) (empowering the FTC to prevent persons, partnerships 
and corporations from using unfair methods of competition in or affecting commerce and 
unfair and deceptive acts in or affecting commerce); Villafranco & Blynn, supra note 7, at 24 
(clarifying that the FTC can enforce the terms of the FTC Act, but private litigants cannot).  
But see F.T.C. v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233, 244 (1972) (affirming “that the [FTC] 
does not arrogate excessive power to itself”).  When determining whether a practice is unfair, 
the FTC looks to the congressionally mandated standard of fairness, and considers pubic 
values beyond those inherit in antitrust law.  Id. 
52 See Miller, supra note 27, at 1488 (arguing that there are at least three different 
interpretations of the type of behavior that the FTC is able to prohibit under Section 5).  In 
2006, the FTC believed that it had the authority to use Section 5 as a stand-alone enforcement 
mechanism, meaning that the FTC only enforced behavior that violated antitrust laws.  Id. at 
1489.  Critics argue that as a procedural matter, the FTC should always begin its Section 5 
violation analysis by asking whether the conduct in question violates antitrust laws.  Id.  
Legal scholars have commented on the fact that if the FTC condemns behavior violating 
antitrust laws under Section 5, the FTC should condemn the behavior simply as an antitrust 
violation.  Id. at 1490. 
53 See id. at 1489 (asserting that the FTC can prohibit behavior under Section 5 that antitrust 
laws cannot reach).  Commissioner Rosch believes that there are pure Section 5 violations 
and suggests that the FTC should not condemn conduct that violates antitrust laws.  Id.  This 
interpretation of Section 5 appears correct to some legal commentators because the FTC has 
the ability to enjoin the unfair methods of competition that antitrust laws cannot reach.  
Miller, supra note 27, at 1489. 
54 See id. (arguing that the FTC can choose to prosecute a price fixing scheme as an antitrust 
violation or can choose to prosecute it under Section 5).  See also ABA ANTITRUST SECTION, 
VOL. I, supra note 29, at 2 (stating that because Section 5 of the FTC Act duplicates other 
antitrust legislation by encompassing violations of the Sherman Act, the Clayton Act, and 
the Robinson-Patman Act, there is debate concerning the scope and boundaries of Section 5).  
The FTC is the only agency involved in enforcement proceedings, which adds to the FTC’s 
broad enforcement powers.  Id.; Robert H. Lande, Revitalizing Section 5 of the FTC Act Using 
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of the FTC Act, the Commission has the ability to create rules that 
specifically define various acts or practices that are unfair or deceptive.55 
President Obama signed the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and 
Consumer Protection Act (“DWPA”) in July of 2010; another piece of 
legislation prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts or practices.56  The DWPA 
addressed the failures of consumer protection legislation by establishing 
a new financial agency, called the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau 
(“CFPB”).57  The CFPB has the authority to prohibit unfair, deceptive, and 
abusive practices from financial lenders.58  The unfairness and deceptive 
                                                 
“Consumer Choice” Analysis, THE ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (2009) (noting that the legislative 
history and Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that Section 5 intended to cover violations 
of other antitrust laws, conduct violating other antitrust laws, conduct violating recognized 
standards of business behavior, and conduct violating competition policy).  In order to file a 
complaint with the FTC alleging Section 5 violations, a consumer has the option to visit the 
FTC’s website, and respond to a questionnaire provided by the FTC.  See FTC, Submit a 
Consumer Complaint to the FTC, http://www.ftc.gov/faq/consumer-protection/submit-
consumer-complaint-ftc [http://perma.cc/V6AU-4D82] (listing the methods for a consumer 
to file a complaint).  Another option consumers have for filing a claim with the FTC is to call 
the FTC directly.  Id.  The FTC accepts complaints related to identity theft, national Do Not 
Call Registry violations, the internet and online privacy, telemarketing scams, credit scams, 
immigration services, sweepstakes, lotteries and prizes, business opportunities and work-at-
home schemes, health and weight loss products, debt collection, credit reports, and financial 
matters.  Id.  The consumer will be asked to choose from a variety of options about the nature 
of their claim and the elements of their claim.  See FTC, FTC Complaint Assistant, 
https://www.ftccomplaintassistant.gov/#crnt&panel1-1 [http://perma.cc/5T4P-66X9] 
(allowing consumers to manually enter in the elements of their complaint and submit it with 
the FTC).  Following an investigation, if the Commissioner determines that he or she believes 
that there has been a violation of the FTC Act, and that a proceeding would be in the public 
interest, the Commissioner can issue and serve an administrative complaint to the person, 
partnership or corporation.  15 U.S.C. § 45(b) (2012). 
55 See 15 U.S.C. § 57a(a)(1)(A) (providing statutory authority that permits the FTC to 
prescribes rules that define the deceptive act or practice in question).  The statute states, 
“except as provided in Subsection (h) of this section, the Commission may prescribe–(A) 
interpretive rules and general statement so of policy with respect to unfair or deceptive acts 
or practices in or affecting commerce . . . .”  Id. 
56 See Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Creating the Consumer Bureau, 
http://www.consumerfinance.gov/the-bureau/creatingthebureau/ [http://perma.cc/ 
ER6X-8KZA] [hereinafter CFPB] (describing the creation of the CFPB).  As a result of the 
severe financial crisis that the United States faced in 2007, many Americans were left with 
loans that they did not understand and in insurmountable debt.  Id.  Additionally, many 
Americans were misled and lured into unaffordable loans by promises of low payments.  Id. 
57 See id. (elaborating on the creation of the CFPB).  Congress passed the CFPB to raise 
government accountability and to supervise and enforce laws over providers of consumer 
financial products and services that escaped Federal oversight.  Id. 
58 See Andrew Smith & James Nguyen, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau:  The First Year, 
44 UCC L. J. 371, 376 (2012) (noting that in 2012 the CFPB did not exercise its authority over 
these practices).  See also CFPB, supra note 56 (describing the purpose of the CFPB).  The 
agency has the responsibly to protect families from unfair, deceptive, and abusive financial 
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tests that the CFPB uses are substantially similar to the current unfairness 
and deceptive tests used by the FTC during Section 5 enforcement.59  Legal 
commentators note that the CFPB’s authority to prohibit acts that are 
substantially similar to Section 5 is controversial because of ill-defined 
terms and broad discretion given to the CFPB to determine established 
principals.60  Like the FTC Act, under the CFPB, consumers are not 
afforded a private right of action.61  As a result of this lack of private right 
of action under federal legislation, states responded by adding their own 
consumer protection statutes.62 
B. State Consumer Protection Law 
A private right of action under consumer protection law permits a 
consumer to file suit on his or her own behalf.63  States have responded to 
a growing need for consumer protection by enacting laws modeled after 
the FTC Act, called Little FTC Acts, and state UDAP laws.64  Most of these 
                                                 
practices.  Id.  President Obama urged Congress to permit the agency with sufficient funding 
so that it can ensure that financial companies comply with consumer protection laws.  Id. 
59 See Smith & Nguyen, supra note 58, at 377 (discussing the unfairness test that the CFPB 
has the authority to use when determining whether an act is unfair, deceptive or abusive).  
Like the FTC’s standards for unfairness, the CFPB must have a reasonable basis to find that 
an act causes injury to consumers, could not be reasonably avoided, and the injury could not 
be outweighed by countervailing benefits to consumers or to competition.  Id. at 376–77.  The 
CFPB does not have a standard definition for a deceptive act; however, the bureau is able to 
look to the FTC’s established precedent of what a deceptive act or practice means.  Id. at 377.  
Finally, the CFPB is able to enforce “abusive” practices, which is an entirely new standard 
that is unenforced by the FTC.  Id. 
60 See id. at 376 (noting that the term “Federal Consumer Financial Law” includes the 
provisions of the Dodd-Frank Act which includes the CFPB’s authority to prohibit unfair, 
deceptive, or abusive practices).  But see Dee Pridgen, Sea Changes in Consumer Financial 
Protection:  Stronger Agency and Stronger Laws, 13 WYO. L. REV. 405, 415 (2013) (arguing that 
the CFPB was created in order to be more powerful than the FTC).  Critics argued that 
Congress created the CFPB because of a growing realization that consumers need quicker 
and more effective enforcement of consumer protection laws.  Id. at 415–16.  Additionally, 
the CFPB is in the position to take advantage of the current shift of consumer behavior away 
from a rational consumer choice theory toward an evidence-based theory of behavior 
economics.  Id. at 416. 
61 Pridgen, supra note 60, at 415 (discussing the CFPB’s ability to deter unfair, deceptive 
or abusive practices). 
62 See infra Part II.B (describing the enactment of state consumer protection law). 
63 See Henry N. Butler & Joshua D. Wright, Are State Consumer Protection Acts Really Little-
FTC Acts?, 63 FLA. L. REV. 163, 165 (2011) (elaborating on State Consumer Protection Acts 
(“CPAS”)).  The CPAS empower “consumer attorneys to act as private attorneys general.”  
Id.  Moreover, CPAS are not limited by political pressure or public duty, like the FTC Act.  
Id.  CPAS protect consumers by allowing private litigants to bring smaller scale cases where 
consumer harm escapes the attention of the FTC.  Id. 
64 See Butler & Wright, supra note 63, at 164–65 (describing the historical perspective for 
state adoption of state consumer protection acts).  Due to a perceived shift of the balance of 
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state laws are modeled after the FTC Act’s method for protecting 
consumers under Section 5.65 
In 2005, nearly twenty jurisdictions, state courts, and agencies were 
required by statute to follow the standards set by the FTC Act and 
interpreted by federal courts.66  Since the 1970’s, most every state, in one 
form or another, has enacted its own Little FTC Acts governing consumer 
protection law.67  Although these Little FTC Acts are modeled after the 
                                                 
power between consumers and merchants in the marketplace—which shifted towards the 
benefits of merchants—regulators determined that there was an increased need for consumer 
protection in the marketplace.  Id. at 164.  This trend for more consumer protection legislation 
began in the 1960’s as traditional common law was inadequate to restore the balance of the 
marketplace.  Id.  See also D. Wes Sullenger, Only We Can Save You:  When and Why Non-
Consumer Businesses Have Standing to Sue Business Competitors Under the Tennessee Consumer 
Protection Act, 35 U. MEM. L. REV. 485, 489 (2005) (“Consumer protection laws arose as a 
response to the perceived inequities of the common law following America’s change to a 
consumer society.”).  Legal scholars discuss that the growing trend in consumer protection 
began by Ralph Nader’s high-profile campaign against automobile manufactures along with 
reports from the American Bar Association accusing the FTC of light enforcement of its 
consumer protection laws.  Id. at 490.  As a response to an over-whelming amount of 
consumer complaints to state authorities, virtually every state created a private right of 
action for consumers.  Id. at 491. 
65 See Butler & Wright, supra note 63, at 165 (“Most CPA’s were originally designed to 
supplement the [FTC’s] mission of protecting consumers from ‘unfair or deceptive acts or 
practices’”); see also John E. Campbell & Oliver Beatty, Huch v. Charter Communications, Inc.:  
Consumer Prey, Corporate Predators, and a Call for the Death of the Voluntary Payment Doctrine 
Defense, 46 VAL. U. L. REV. 501, 522 (2012) (noting that “Little FTC Acts” or UDAP statutes 
are a supplement to common law fraud remedies, which ultimately provides a more flexible 
tool to hold companies accountable); Sullenger, supra note 64, at 492 (describing the legal 
history of consumer protection acts). 
66 See Mize, supra note 45, at 665 (describing the Tennessee Code which provides, “[i]t is 
the intent of the general assembly that [the deceptive trade practices act] shall be interpreted 
and construed consistently with the interpretations given by the federal trade commission 
and the federal courts pursuant to § 5(A)(1) of the Federal Trade Commission Act”).  
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Connecticut, Florida, Georgia, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois, Maine, 
Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New Hampshire, New Mexico, Rhode Island, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Vermont, and Washington were among the jurisdictions 
required to follow the standards set by the FTC Act.  Id.  See also Jeff Sovern, Private Actions 
Under the Deceptive Trade Practices Acts:  Reconsidering the FTC as a Rule Model, 52 OHIO ST. L. 
J. 437, 450 n.74 (1991) (listing the states that were required to follow the FTC Act standards 
in 2005); Sullenger, supra note 64, at 493 (“Twenty states have enacted the Little FTC Act.”). 
67 See Toward Greater Equality in Business Transactions:  A Proposal to Extend the Little FTC 
Acts to Small Businesses, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1621, 1622 n.6 (1983) [hereinafter Toward Greater 
Equality] (describing that as of 1980, forty-two states have created a statutory right for a 
private right of action for consumers).  Within ten years of the passing of the development 
of the first model UDAP laws, virtually every state passed its own consumer protection act.  
Id. at 1622.  These state statutes eliminate the common law principles barring recovery from 
consumers, but also provide remedies that are more favorable to consumers than remedies 
offered under common law.  Id.  This benefit for consumers is based around the idea that 
consumers are awarded either discretionary or mandatory attorneys’ fees from state statutes.  
Id.  Furthermore, under many state statutes consumers are awarded minimum and multiple 
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FTC Act, consumers have dissimilar resources, goals, and motives for 
bringing actions.68  Moreover, there have been three different policy 
reasons for creating Little FTC Acts.69 
First, state legislators enacted the laws to correct an imbalance of 
power between buyers and sellers in the marketplace.70  The doctrine of 
caveat emptor, or let the buyer beware, is no longer valid, thus creating the 
need to enact state consumer protection statutes.71  The second policy 
reason for enacting Little FTC Acts was because the acts made litigating 
consumer claims more economical.72  Finally, states adopted state 
consumer protection statutes because they deter other potential unfair or 
deceptive practices.73  In addition, states enacted uniform deceptive acts 
                                                 
damages for prevailing on a claim.  Id.  See also S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-34-31 (2016) 
(authorizing consumers under South Dakota law to bring a civil action for damages from an 
unfair or deceptive act).  “Any person who claims to have been adversely affected by an act 
or a practice declared to be unlawful by § 37-24-6 shall be permitted to bring a civil action 
for the recovery of actual damages suffered as a result of such act or practice.”  Id. 
68 See Mize, supra note 45, at 665 (explaining the differences in consumer motivation).  One 
of the main arguments for why the FTC and Little FTC Acts have different goals and motives 
is that the FTC faces political pressure because the commissioners are appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate.  Id. at 666.  The issue with facing political pressure is 
that Congress may potentially “rein [in the commissioners] if they go too far,” which results 
in the commissioners targeting cases that they have a high possibility of success of winning 
and to promulgate broad standards to achieve that success.  Id.  Additionally, there are 
various funding differences for state and federal governments in stopping deceptive 
practices.  Id.  For example, in 2004, the FTC had a $186,000,000 budget for regulating 
American advertisements.  Id.  The South Dakota Consumer Protection Department operated 
on a mere $6,576,463 budget in 2004.  2900 Legal Services Program, Attorney General 
Governor’s Recommended FY 2007 Budget, (Nov. 29, 2005, 12:53:58 PM), 
http://bfm.sd.gov/budget/rec07/07r2900.htm [http://perma.cc/68X8-GHAT] (listing the 
empirical data of the South Dakota Consumer Protection operating budget for 2004).  Lastly, 
the FTC is limited in the type of cases that it brings because it is only allowed to file 
complaints that are in the public’s interest.  Mize, supra note 45, at 666–67. 
69 See Toward Greater Equality, supra note 67, at 1625 (describing the legal history of Little 
FTC Acts); infra notes 78–80 and accompanying text (distinguishing between the three 
different policy reasons for enacting FTC Acts). 
70 See Toward Greater Equality, supra note 67, at 1625 (clarifying that historically the law 
considered buyers and sellers to have equal power, however, this equal balance of power no 
longer occurs).  Traditionally, the law has recognized that buyers and sellers were on equal 
footing meaning that the “buyers were knowledgeable about the products that they 
purchased and maintained a long-term commercial relationships with local merchants.”  Id. 
71 See id. (noting the reasons for the enactment of Little FTC Acts). 
72 See id. at 1626 (focusing on the fact that traditionally, under the American rule, each 
party pays his own attorney’s fees).  The traditional American fee system would make 
litigating consumer claims unfeasible economically because litigation costs would likely 
outweigh recovery costs.  Id.  Legal commentators have argued, however, that attorneys’ fees 
awarded to prevailing plaintiffs effectively vindicates defrauded consumers.  Id. 
73 See Toward Greater Equality, supra note 67, at 1626 (stating that successful private 
litigation will deter businesses from defrauding other consumers).  Arguably, when 
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and practices to ensure that states responded to consumer protection 
needs.74 
In the early 1960s, the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws first approved a standard form of consumer 
protection called the Uniform Deceptive Trade Practices Act 
(“UDTPA”).75  The UDTPA created a standard for states to follow 
regarding deceptive trade practice enforcement.76  Under the UDTPA, 
eleven deceptive trade practices were listed.77  The UDTPA permitted a 
private right of action; however, the only remedy available for consumers 
was injunctive relief.78  In addition to the UDTPA, the model statute that 
                                                 
consumers have a private remedy, a merchant will not be able to rely only upon a FTC 
decision, but should know that any defrauded person or entity may file a suit.  Id. 
74 See supra Part II.B (providing legal history of state uniform deceptive acts and practices). 
75 See Toward Greater Equality, supra note 67, at 1623 (examining the legal history and 
purposes of the Little FTC Acts).  The UDTPA codified and standardized the consumer 
protection statutes.  Id.  Under the UDTPA, the principal beneficiary was the business 
competitor injured by the competition and not the consumer.  Id. at 1624. 
76 See Staci Zaretsky, Trademark Law and Consumer Protection Law—Deception Is a Cruel Act:  
“Uniform” State Deceptive Trade Practices Acts and Their Deceptive Effects on the Trademark 
Claims of Corporate Competitors, 32 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 549, 562 (2010) (describing the legal 
history of the UDTPA).  The UDTPA created a uniform standard by proscribing specific 
practices that may create the “likelihood of public deception.”  Id. 
77 See Sullenger, supra note 64, at 491 n.38 (describing the legal history of the UDTPA laws).  
The types of acts that the UDTPA prohibits are: 
(1) passing off goods or services as those of another; (2) causing a 
likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to the source, 
sponsorship, approval, or certification of goods or services; (3) causing 
a likelihood of confusion or of misunderstanding as to affiliation, 
connection, or association with, or certification by, another; (4) using 
deceptive representations or designations of geographic origin in 
connection with goods or services; (5) representing that goods or 
services have sponsorship, approval, characteristics, ingredients, uses, 
benefits, or quantities they do not have or that a person has a 
sponsorship, approval, status, affiliation, or connection he does not 
have; (6) representing that goods are original or new if they are 
deteriorated, altered, reconditioned, reclaimed, used, or secondhand; (7) 
representing that goods or services are of a particular standard, quality, 
or grade, or that goods are of a particular style or model, if they are of 
another; (8) disparaging the goods, services, or business of another by 
false or misleading representation of fact; (9) advertising goods or 
services with intent not to sell them as advertised; (10) advertising goods 
or services with intent not to supply reasonably expectable public 
demand, unless the advertisement discloses a limitation of quantity; and 
(11) making false or misleading statements of fact concerning the 
reasons for, existence of, or amounts of price reductions. (internal 
citations omitted) 
Id. at 491–92. 
78 See Butler & Wright, supra note 63, at 170 (“[T]he UDTPA granted a private right of 
action but limited the remedy to injunctive relief.”).  In response to injunctive relief not being 
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accompanies most consumer protection laws is the Model Unfair Trade 
Practices and Consumer Protection Law (“UTPCL”).79  Consumers can file 
actions under the UTPCL against acts defined as:  (1) false; (2) misleading 
or deceptive; or (3) deceptive acts or practices in the conduct of any trade 
or commerce.80  In addition to states granting a private right of action to 
strengthen consumer protection, courts have addressed the issue of 
whether a private right of action should be implied under Section 5 for the 
consumer’s benefit.81 
C. Judicial Interpretation of a Private Enforcement of Section 5 
Moore v. New York Cotton Exchange was a seminal Supreme Court 
decision that decided whether a private right of action existed under the 
FTC Act.82  In Moore, the New York Cotton Exchange allegedly created a 
monopoly on cotton.83  The complaint purported the monopoly 
                                                 
an adequate option for consumer redress, the UDTPA was amended in 1966 to authorize the 
granting of reasonable attorneys’ fees.  Id.  “[Additionally,] [m]ost states that initially 
adopted the UDTPA . . . amended their consumer protection law to allow monetary relief to 
consumers.”  Id. 
79 See Toward Greater Equality, supra note 67, at 1624 (summarizing the legal history of the 
UTPCL).  The UTPCL was developed by the FTC and was originally published in 1967, but 
was amended in subsequent years.  Id. at 1625.  Under the UTPCL, state attorneys generals 
are authorized to sue to enjoin deceptive practices or anticompetitive practices that harm 
businesses.  Id.  Additionally, the act provides a cause of action for consumers.  Id. 
80 See Butler & Wright, supra note 63, at 171 (focusing on the legal history of the UTPCL 
and the causes of action a consumer can allege from it).  As of 2011, five jurisdictions prohibit 
specific acts without a general “catch-all” provision once available.  Id. at 172.  Those five 
jurisdictions are Colorado, District of Columbia, Indiana, Mississippi, and New York.  Id. at 
172 n.63.  Additionally, twenty-six jurisdictions adopted a laundry list approach to 
prohibiting anticompetitive behaviors, which included the prohibitions from the UDTPA 
and added a provision, which prohibited “any act or practice that was unfair to the 
consumer.”  Id. at 171–72.  See supra note 77 and accompanying text (listing the eleven 
provisions in the UDTPA).  Those twenty-six jurisdictions are Alabama, Arkansas, Arizona, 
California, Georgia, Guam, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Michigan, Nebraska, 
Nevada, New Mexico, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Dakota, Tennessee, 
Texas, Utah, Virginia, Virgin Islands, and West Virginia.  Butler & Wright, supra note 63, at 
172 n.62. 
81 See infra Part II.C (describing the Moore, Holloway, and Guernsey decisions, all of which 
discuss whether a private right to action should be granted to plaintiffs under the FTC Act). 
82 See Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 603 (1926) (establishing the precedent that 
private litigants do not have the authority to initiate a lawsuit under the FTC Act and that 
relief to a consumer under the FTC Act must be granted by the FTC). 
83 See id. at 602 (finding that the New York Exchange operated a monopoly).  The 
monopoly that was created was located in the Odd-Lot Cotton Exchange.  Id.  The Odd-Lot 
Cotton Exchange was an organization whose members created contracts with themselves 
and for customers for the purposes of delivering cotton in lots.  Id. at 601.  After investigation, 
Odd-Lot had many members in its membership that took part in conducting a bucket shop, 
and Odd-Lot was organized as a cover up to enable its members to engage in illegal practices.  
Id. at 602. 
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constituted an unfair method of competition in violation of the FTC Act.84  
For the first time, the Court held that there was not a private right of action 
afforded to consumers under the FTC Act.85  The Court reasoned that an 
attempt to allege unfair methods of competition must be set aside because 
relief in such cases should be afforded first by the FTC.86 
After Moore, Congress passed the WLA in 1938 as a way to expand the 
FTC’s jurisdiction for prohibiting unfair or deceptive acts.87  One objective 
of the WLA was to streamline the procedure for enforcing the FTC’s cease 
and desist orders.88  The FTC sought legislation to establish its ability to 
combat deceptive acts without the requirement that they first must show 
a clear adverse impact to competition.89  Prior to the enactment of the 
WLA, the Supreme Court interpreted Section 5 to mean that the FTC could 
only prohibit practices that injured competitors and not consumers.90  
Additionally, the FTC had to prove injury before it could establish a 
violation.91  As a result of the WLA, the FTC was left with broadened 
                                                 
84 See Moore, 270 U.S. at 603 (describing the procedural background).  Federal jurisdiction 
was invoked under antitrust law of the United States.  Id. at 602.  The Odd-Lot Cotton 
Exchange entered into a contract with the Western Union in restraint of trade.  Id. at 602–03. 
85 See id. at 603 (stating that relief must be provided by the FTC).  The court did not discuss 
its reasoning for determining that the FTC is required to provide relief at the first instance 
and instead decided the additional issues brought before the Court.  Id. 
86 See id. (reasoning that relief must be afforded by the FTC before a plaintiff can file a 
lawsuit against an FTC violation). 
87 See Dale Pollack & Bruce Teichner, The Federal Trade Commission’s Deception Enforcement 
Policy, 35 DEPAUL L. REV. 125, 127 (1985) (describing the WLA).  The WLA broadened the 
FTC act by allowing the FTC to bar deceptive acts or practices in or affecting commerce.  Id.  
Congress left it up to the FTC to decide what deceptive acts or practices were and since 1938, 
the definition of deception has evolved considerably.  Id. at 127–28.  See also Daniel J. Solove 
& Woodrow Hartzog, The FTC and the New Common Law of Privacy, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 583, 
598 (2014) (noting that since the FTC was created in 1914, the agency’s powers gradually 
increased over a number of years).  “One of the most significant expansions [to the FTC’s 
powers] occurred when Congress passed the Wheeler-Lea Amendments to the [FTC Act].”  
Id. 
88  See United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 429 (2d Cir. 1974) (describing the 
objectives of the WLA).  J.B. Williams Co. noted that Congress does not indicate that by 
providing a civil penalty enforcement procedure, Congress intended to transfer the 
responsibility for interpreting and investigating violations of the FTC Act to the Attorney 
General.  Id.  See also Pollack & Teichner, supra note 87, at 127–28 (elaborating on the FTC’s 
increased power due to the passing of the WLA). 
89 See Holloway v. Bristol-Meyers, 485 F.2d 986, 992 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (providing the legal 
history of the WLA).  See also Arthur B. Cornell, Jr., Federal Trade Commission Permanent 
Injunction Actions Against Unfair and Deceptive Practices:  The Proper Case and the Proper Proof, 
61 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 503, 515 (1987) (noting that Congress added the WLA to overturn 
Supreme Court interpretation). 
90 See Cornell, supra note 89, at 515 (describing the history of the WLA). 
91 See id. (introducing the concept  that the FTC could not establish a claim without 
proving that injury occurred prior to the enactment of the WLA). 
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authority and greater responsibility because of the broad definition of 
“deceptive act or practice” left open by Congress.92 
In 1971, Holloway v. Bristol-Myers cited to Moore, and determined that 
private parties were not afforded a private right of action under Section 
5.93  In Holloway, the appellant filed a complaint against Bristol-Myers 
Corporation, the manufacturer of Excedrin.94  The complaint alleged that 
Bristol-Myers represented that Excedrin was a more effective pain reliever 
than aspirin and that Holloway’s advertisements were “false, deceptive, 
and materially misleading.”95  Further, in reliance of the advertisements, 
consumers were—and would continue to be—induced to purchase the 
over-the-counter medicine.96  The central question in the case was whether 
consumers and members of the general public have the ability to bring a 
private action to enforce Sections 5, 12, and 14 of the FTC Act.97  The court 
determined that because Congress did not alter the Moore interpretation, 
private enforcement of Section 5 was precluded.98  In its decision, the court 
discussed the option for judicial authority, which the court referred to as 
its judicial latitude, to imply private remedies.99 
Since the FTC Act was and still is the product of a legislative balance 
of consumer protection and the interests of the businesses affected, the 
                                                 
92 See Pollack & Teichner, supra note 87, at 127–28 (illustrating the FTC’s increased power 
due to the passing of the WLA). 
93 Holloway, 485 F.2d at 997.  The Holloway court discussed Moore’s decision when it was 
analyzing the growing consumer interests that took place after Moore.  Id.  Holloway noted 
that there was growth in consumer rights after the 1938 amendments (the WLA) to the FTC 
Act.  Id. 
94 See id. at 987 (providing the procedural background).  The complaint was filed to 
represent the interest of the consuming public and advertising audience.  Id.  Excedrin is a 
non-prescription analgesic compound.  Id. 
95 Holloway, 485 F.2d at 988. 
96 See id. (arguing that consumers suffered a pecuniary loss as a result of purchasing 
Excedrin).  Furthermore, Holloway asserted that it would be to the detriment of consumers 
if they purchased Excedrin, because the consumers could have instead purchased other 
equally effective, and less expensive analgesics.  Id.  The appellants sought declaratory and 
injunctive relief based on the claim.  Id. 
97 See id. at 988 (holding that consumers do not have a private right of action).  The court 
acknowledged that the issue has been discussed by many legal scholars and added its 
opinion “primarily to enlarge on the well-nigh dispositive history and structure of the 
legislation, and in part to amplify and redefine the core analysis.”  Id. 
98 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 997 (determining that Congress intended WLA enforcement to 
rest exclusively with the FTC).  The court reached its conclusion by analyzing the intent of 
Congress by passing the amendments, and described that the FTC Act had been interpreted 
by Moore to mean that Section 5 claims must be brought by the FTC and not by private 
parties.  Id. 
99 See id. (analyzing whether the courts should look to the social objectives sought to be 
furthered by the statute). The court determined that the FTC Act is a product of a “legislative 
balance which took into account not only consumer protection but also the interests of the 
businesses affected . . . .”  Id. 
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court determined that its judicial latitude for implying a private remedy 
was limited.100  Holloway considered a variety of factors inherent in the 
FTC’s ability to enforce the FTC Act and took into consideration the 
problems that might occur with public enforcement of it.101  First, the court 
recognized that private litigants do not have the same ability as the FTC 
to enforce the FTC Act.102  Second, the resulting consequence of private 
litigants not having coordinated enforcement programs may burden the 
defendants and the judicial system.103  Finally, the court determined that 
the advantages of having the FTC as a quasi-judicial tribunal would be 
diminished if private litigants had the option to file suit under Section 5.104 
The court ultimately reached its decision in Holloway by analyzing that 
the rationale for implying a private right of action rested upon five factors 
established in J.I. Case Company v. Borak.105  The determination for 
implying a private right of action includes:  (1) a federal prohibition 
against the acts complained; (2) inclusion of the defendant in the class in 
which compliance has been imposed; (3) legislative intent to place the 
injured party within the realm of the statute’s protection; (4) whether the 
                                                 
100 See id. (reasoning that because the court considered an act with social ends to be fostered 
through the administrative means of achieving those objectives are inseparably interwoven 
into a unified and comprehensive statutory fabric, the court must act carefully in deciding 
whether a plaintiff has a private right to action). 
101 See id. (listing among those factors, “the relative seriousness of the departure from 
accepted trade practices, its probable effect on the public welfare, the disruption to settled 
commercial relationships that enforcement proceedings would entail, and weather action is 
to be taken against a single party on an industry-wide basis . . . ”).  The court also took into 
account the FTC’s ability to determine “the form that an action should take, the most 
appropriate remedy, the precedential value of the rule of law sought to be established, and 
a host of other considerations.”  Holloway, 485 F.2d at 997. 
102 See id. at 997–98 (reasoning that private litigants can create piecemeal lawsuits which 
do not reflect coordinated enforcement).  Holloway also reasoned that private litigants are not 
subjected to the same constraints of weighing each action against the FTC’s broad range 
policy goals.  Id. at 998. 
103 See id. (arguing that private litigants may institute disorganized lawsuits).  The court 
discussed that disorganized lawsuits by private plaintiffs would reflect “disparate concerns 
and not a coordinated enforcement program.”  Id. at 997–98.  The consequences of having a 
private right of action, according to the court, would burden the defendants in the case and 
the judicial system.  Id. 
104 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 997–98 (stating that the advantages of the FTC tribunal would 
be jeopardized if it was replaced by various federal courts).  Holloway considered procedural 
methods for class actions and the consolidation of multi-district litigation in reaching its 
decision.  Id.  The court also applied the principles of collateral estoppel for alleviating the 
differences of FTC enforcement versus private enforcement of Section 5.  Id. 
105 See id. at 989 (finding that Borak analyzed a number of the precedents brought forth in 
Holloway).  The appellants argued that the court should recognize an implied private right of 
action, and pointed to instances where civil remedies have been implied to various federal 
regulatory statutes.  Id.; J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426, 435 (1964) (holding that there is 
federal jurisdiction over relief). 
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defendant proximately caused harm from a breach of duty; and (5) the 
unavailability or ineffectiveness of alternative avenues of redress.106  
Holloway cautioned that “these five factors are necessary, but not sufficient 
for implying a private right of action[.]”107  Without stating a reason why, 
the court examined factors three and five of this test, but did not examine 
the remaining factors.108  As a result, consumer-plaintiffs do not have a 
private right of action under the FTC Act and courts have consistently 
relied upon this decision when the issue is brought before them.109 
Three years after Holloway, the United States District Court for the 
Northern District of Indiana determined in Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the 
Midwest that a private right of action existed under Section 5, but only 
when an act was subject to an earlier cease and desist order issued by the 
FTC.110  In Guernsey, the Guernseys alleged that Rich Plan violated Section 
5 by using sale practices that had been previously found unlawful by the 
FTC.111  Rich Plan filed a motion to dismiss based on the theory that there 
is no private right of action under Section 5 and that the FTC had original 
jurisdiction over the case.112  The court reasoned that to effectuate the 
                                                 
106 Holloway, 485 F.2d at 989 (citing to the opinion of Judge Jones in J.I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 
U.S. 426 (1964)).  In addition to focusing on factors three and five, the Holloway court focused 
on the objectives that Congress sought to advance by enacting the FTC act.  Id. 
107 See id. (cautioning that the five factors are necessary, but not sufficient conditions, and 
their combined presence does not automatically warrant the implication of a private right). 
108 See id. (determining that the analysis should be conjoined with analyzing the two 
factors, “legislative intent, and the ineffectiveness by Congress for effectuating its objective”).  
Additionally, the court noted that the issue should be treated with care, due to the fact that 
the statutory scheme was created by a delicate balance.  Id.  The balance that was created by 
the statutory scheme was a combination of public need and private interests.  Id. 
109 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 989 (holding that consumers do not have a private right of 
action under the FTC Act); see also United States v. J.B. Williams Co., 498 F.2d 414, 444 (2d 
Cir. 1974) (discussing Holloway’s holding); Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 280 (9th 
Cir. 1973) (holding that Section 5 of the FTC Act does not provide plaintiffs with a private 
remedy); Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582, 586 (N.D. Ind. 1976) 
(“Federal Courts have historically found that no private action could be implied from the 
Federal Trade Commission Act”).  Supra note 6 and accompanying text (listing subsequent 
cases that follow Holloway). 
110 See Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 589 (holding that plaintiffs stated a claim upon which relief 
could be granted by alleging that the practices which defendant participated in are 
proscribed by the FTC Act); see also Days Inn of Am. Franchising, Inc. v. Windham, 699 F. 
Supp. 1581, 1583 (N.D. Ga. 1988) (analyzing Guernsey’s holding as the sole federal decision 
supporting the position that a private right of action exists under the FTC Act). 
111 See Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 586 (describing the complaint, and the theories that Rich 
Plan’s motion to dismiss were based upon). 
112 See id. (noting that the FTC Act contains no provisions that provide for a private right 
of action). 
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purposes of the FTC Act the defendant’s motion to dismiss should be 
denied.113 
The basis of Guernsey’s reasoning was grounded in the fact that the 
FTC’s ability to deter consumer fraud is questionable and that it has 
primary, rather than exclusive, jurisdiction over the FTC Act.114  The court 
determined that the FTC’s ability to resolve consumer complaints was 
problematic because the FTC could not resolve each individual consumer 
dispute that came before it.115  At the time of Guernsey, the FTC received 
about 9000 consumer complaints each year and only investigated one out 
of nine of them.116  Out of the complaints investigated, approximately ten 
percent resulted in a cease and desist letter.117 
Distinguishing itself from Holloway, the Indiana court noted that the 
facts in each case are significantly different from one another based on the 
harm suffered.118  In Holloway, the harm suffered was the difference 
between the price of a bottle of Excedrin and a bottle of aspirin.119 
However, in Guernsey the harm suffered was the violation of a cease and 
desist order.120  Guernsey determined that in order to imply a private right 
of action from a federal regulatory statute the court should apply the 
                                                 
113 See id. at 586–88 (discussing the fact that most defrauded consumers do not have a 
remedy because the FTC cannot act on behalf of every single consumer that is harmed, and 
that the FTC is only able to investigate only a small number of the complaints that it receives 
each year). 
114 See id. at 588 (illustrating the fact that there is no legislative intent which indicates that 
the FTC should have exclusive jurisdiction over the FTC Act).  Guernsey pointed out that 
Holloway did not cite to authority in reaching its conclusion that Congress intended sole 
enforcement power to the FTC.  Id. at 588.  Additionally, Guernsey noted that to infer that 
once the FTC has entered a case and enforced compliance with the Act, that subsequent 
consumer actions would frustrate the purposes of the Act and would deny consumers who 
were victimized by violations any recovery.  Id. 
115 See Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 586 (arguing that the voluminous complaints that the FTC 
receives makes it nearly impossible for the resolution of every one). 
116 See id. (highlighting the FTC’s enforcement methods and how the amount of complaints 
the agency received each year from consumers affected it and providing empirical data for 
how many complaints the agency received at the time). 
117 See id. (describing the amount of complaints the FTC receives each year, and how it is 
difficult to enforce Section 5 in every case). 
118 See id. at 587 (noting that the consumer in Holloway suffered minimal damages, while 
the consumers in Guernsey sought relief from harm that occurred after a cease and desist 
order was violated).  The only harm that the plaintiff suffered in Holloway was the lost 
difference in price between six fifty-tablet bottles of Excedrin and the same number of aspirin 
tablets.  Id. 
119 See id. (distinguishing the plaintiffs in Holloway based on the fact that the harm suffered 
by the Guernseys was much greater than the harm suffered by the plaintiffs in Holloway). 
120 See Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 587 (contrasting between the facts of Holloway and Guernsey 
and suggesting that the main difference is the harm that the plaintiffs suffered). 
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doctrine of implication.121  The doctrine of implication requires that a court 
determine whether the provision violated was designed to protect a class 
of citizens from the harm that the plaintiffs complained.122  If yes, then the 
court must determine if it is appropriate in light of the statute’s purpose 
to afford the plaintiff the remedy sought.123 
Guernsey concluded that because the FTC examined the complained-
of practice and found the practice bad enough to issue a cease and desist 
order, the plaintiffs could bring an enforcement action.124  Additionally, 
Guernsey stated that if Rich Plan violated the cease and desist order, it is 
apparent that the FTC Act, as the FTC enforces it, is an empty promise to 
consumers.125  The court stated that when weighing the benefits to the 
consumer against any damage to the FTC’s role in applying the broad 
provisions of the FTC Act, the court must rule in favor of the consuming 
public.126  Finally, Guernsey determined that to conclude the FTC was in a 
better place than a private litigant to determine the cost of litigating a 
deceptive practice, ignored the theory of free enterprise economy.127  In a 
free enterprise economy, the consumers have the ability to choose 
between merchants on the basis of price, service, and quality.128 
                                                 
121 See id. at 586 (emphasizing the point that federal courts have historically found that 
there is no implication of a private right of action regardless of the doctrine of implication). 
122 See id. (listing the first factor applicable under the doctrine of implication which is that 
a court must determine that the provision violated was designed to protect a class of persons, 
including the plaintiffs, from the harm that the plaintiffs complained of). 
123 See id. (stating the second factor of the doctrine of implication which is that the court 
must determine that it is appropriate in light of the statute’s purposes to afford plaintiffs the 
remedy sought). 
124 See id. at 588 (reasoning that the FTC is in a better position to gauge the injury a 
deceptive practice will cause the public and to balance this injury against the likely cost of 
elimination of the deceptive act or practice). 
125 See id. (determining that the FTC put its ponderous administrative process in motion to 
enforce the FTC Act against Rich Plan, and since the company violated the cease and desist 
order the FTC issued, the FTC failed at enforcing the Act). 
126 See Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 588 (concluding that if the FTC does not allow a private 
right of action to enforce cease and desist orders, consumers are harmed and denied 
recovery). 
127 See id. (describing Holloway’s reasoning for determining that the FTC is in a better 
position than private litigants to enforce the FTC Act because of its overview of the national 
economy). 
128 See id. (arguing that by permitting the FTC to be the sole enforcer of the FTC Act, courts 
are denying the right afforded to consumers to participate freely in a free enterprise 
economy).  See also William J. Curran III, Beyond Economic Concepts and Categories:  A 
Democratic Refiguration of Antitrust Law, 31 ST. LOUIS U. L.J. 349, 350 n.8 (1987) (introducing 
the Supreme Court’s view on antitrust, which is that “[a]ntitrust laws in general, and the 
Sherman Act in particular, are the Magna Carta of a free enterprise [economy]”).  According 
to the Supreme Court in United States v. Tapco Associations, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972), a free 
enterprise economy is important to the preservation of an economic freedom and our free-
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Although Guernsey ruled in favor of consumers, the problem of not 
having a private right of action under Section 5 still exists because 
consumers are not afforded an express right under the FTC Act.129  Thus, 
Part III of this Note analyzes the current legal framework between state 
and federal consumer protection laws and evaluates why Holloway 
reached the wrong decision by not implying a private right of action for 
consumers.130  Only after examining the differences between consumer 
protection laws and examining why Guernsey was a step in the right 
direction for consumers, can one understand why amending Section 5 of 
the FTC Act is vital for consumer protection.131 
III.  ANALYSIS 
The current legal framework available to consumers under state 
consumer protection laws differs noticeably from the legal framework 
available to the FTC under Section 5.132  Consumers are not afforded the 
same broad enforcement abilities under state consumer protection laws as 
the FTC.133  Additionally, the FTC’s current enforcement of Section 5 
leaves consumers susceptible to being injured by unfair or deceptive 
                                                 
enterprise system as the Bill of Rights is fundamental to the protection of our individual 
freedom.  Id. at 350. 
129 See supra Part II.C (providing the basis for Guernsey’s holding which was largely based 
on the fact that the plaintiffs satisfied the doctrine of implication and by permitting the 
plaintiffs to have a cause of action under the FTC Act, the court was achieving the purpose 
of the FTC Act because the FTC had already deemed the defendant’s acts unlawful which 
was evidenced by the FTC issuing a cease and desist order). 
130 See infra Part III.A (examining the difference between state and federal consumer 
protection laws based on the fact that state laws are not as broad as the FTC’s enforcement 
capabilities under the FTC Act); see also infra Part III.B (analyzing Holloway’s reasoning and 
how it was incorrect because the court did not properly analyze the factors for implying a 
private right to action, in addition to incorrectly analyzing congressional intent for not 
overturning Moore); infra Part III.C (assessing Guernsey, the Indiana decision determining 
that plaintiffs have a cause of action under Section 5 of the FTC Act, when asserting a claim 
against a defendant who violated an earlier cease and desist letter issued by the FTC, and 
concluding that the court reached the correct result based on congressional intent for creating 
the FTC Act and the ineffectiveness of the FTC in resolving consumer complaints). 
131 See infra Part III (establishing how federal and state consumer protection laws differ, 
how Holloway reached the wrong decision, and how Guernsey was a step in the right direction 
for consumers). 
132 See infra Part III.A (examining the differences between state and federal consumer 
protection law); supra Part II.A (discussing federal consumer protection law and the broad 
enforcement abilities of the FTC); supra Part II.B (describing state consumer protection law 
and the laundry list of actions that consumers are able to bring). 
133 See supra Part II.A (introducing the FTC’s abilities to enforce Section 5 and Congress’ 
reasoning why the FTC has broad enforcement powers to prohibit unfair or deceptive 
conduct); see also infra Part III.A (analyzing the discrepancies between state and federal 
legislation and the impact that the differences between the two has on consumer protection). 
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conduct.134  The current legislation governing private rights of action for 
consumers is inadequate compared to the legislation afforded to the FTC, 
thus, Congress should amend the FTC Act to provide a private right of 
action for consumers.135 
First, Part III.A analyzes the problems consumers are faced with by 
not having a private right of action.136  Second, Part III.B examines why 
the court’s reasoning in Holloway was incorrect, based on the 
congressional intent for empowering the FTC with the ability to enforce 
Section 5.137  Finally, Part III.C analyzes the court’s reasoning in Guernsey 
and how the court’s holding was correct, based on the FTC’s inability to 
respond to consumer complaints and the implementation of the CFPB.138 
A. Federal vs. State Consumer Protection Law 
Consumers are not afforded enough protection because state 
consumer protection laws do not offer the same broad enforcement 
capabilities that are offered to the FTC.139  States enacted Little FTC Acts 
and UDAP laws in an attempt to provide consumers with the same 
consumer protection enforcement capabilities as the FTC, but because 
these acts are qualitatively different than FTC enforcement, consumers 
                                                 
134 See supra Part II.C (listing Guernsey’s reasoning for permitting consumers to enforce a 
cease and desist order due to the fact that FTC enforcement was lacking as a result of the 
amount of complaints that come before the FTC, and the inability for the agency to respond 
to the complaints); see also infra Part III.C (concluding that the FTC is unable to keep up with 
the current demands of consumer protection because the agency is not able to investigate 
every consumer complaint, therefore, Congress should amend Section 5 to include a private 
right of action so that consumers can enforce laws enacted for their protection). 
135 See infra Part IV.A (suggesting an amendment to the FTC Act that would implement a 
private right of action for consumers). 
136 See infra Part III.A (analogizing the discrepancies between state and federal consumer 
protection law and the impact that differences have on consumers because the FTC has broad 
enforcement capabilities while consumers are left with only being able to enforce certain 
practices under state consumer protection laws). 
137 See infra Part III.B (examining why Holloway incorrectly reasoned that there is no 
implied private right of action under the FTC Act based on the fact that Holloway did not 
analyze all of the five factors for implying a private right of action and based on incorrectly 
interpreting the congressional intent for passing the WLA). 
138 See infra Part IV (proposing that the phrase “consumer plaintiff” be added throughout 
the existing language of Section 5 in order to create an express private right of action for 
consumers, which would result in stronger consumer protection and adequate consumer 
redress); supra Part II.A (describing the enactment of the CFPB and the reasons for its 
creation). 
139 See supra Part II.B (introducing state consumer protection laws and how some states do 
not permit consumers to have an injunction issued against a violator, additionally the FTC 
is able to enforce more than pure Section 5 violations, such as antitrust law violations, 
whereas consumers are not afforded this same opportunity). 
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should be provided a private right to enforce Section 5.140  These state laws 
are qualitatively different because they are not as broad as Section 5.141  
Under Section 5, the FTC has the ability to enforce Sections 3, 5, 7, and 8 
of the Clayton Act, while under most Little FTC Acts and UDAP laws, 
consumers only have the option to go after a proscribed list of practices.142  
The FTC also has the authority to enforce pure Section 5 violations and 
antitrust laws; consumers are not afforded this same protection under 
                                                 
140 See Butler & Wright, supra note 63, at 165 (arguing that state consumer protection acts, 
or Little FTC Acts were designed to supplement the FTC’s mission of protecting consumers).  
There is a growing concern that enforcement under these state consumer protection acts is 
both qualitatively different than FTC enforcement and might also be counterproductive for 
consumers.  Id. at 166.  See supra Part II.B (describing the legal history of Little FTC Acts and 
UDAP laws); see also supra note 66 and accompanying text (listing the states that have enacted 
Little FTC Acts); supra note 80 and accompanying text (providing a list of the jurisdictions 
that have enacted UDAP laws); supra Part II.A (describing Section 5’s passing and legal 
history especially noting that Section 5 was enacted to provide the FTC broad enforcement 
powers).  The FTC enforces whatever action it decides is unfair or deceptive, while UDAP 
limits consumer enforcement of specific provisions of their states consumer protection laws, 
thus providing substantially different enforcement options.  See supra note 77 and 
accompanying text (listing the types of acts that consumers are able to enforce under UDAP 
laws); ANTITRUST SECTION, VOL. I, supra note 29, at 64 (noting that “private plaintiffs asserting 
a cause of action based on Section 5 have generally failed to convince courts that a private 
right of action should be implied”); supra Part II.A (elaborating on Section 5 of the FTC Act 
and its legal history); supra Part II.C (providing the legal background of the Moore and 
Holloway decisions concluding that Section 5 does not provide a private right of action to 
consumers).  Moore determined that an action for recovery under Section 5 could not stand 
because the FTC must first provide relief.  Moore v. N.Y. Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 603 
(1926). 
141 See supra Part II.A (listing the broad enforcement methods of the FTC).  See also supra 
note 48 and accompanying text (describing the types of acts that the FTC can enforce aside 
from pure Section 5 violations such as foreign antitrust laws and Clayton Act violations).  In 
addition to enforcing the express provision of Section 5, the FTC has the authority to go after 
behavior that violates antitrust laws.  Id.  Additionally, the FTC has the ability to decide what 
an unfair or deceptive act is, subject to the three-part test that the FTC uses to determine 
whether an act is unfair or deceptive.  Id. 
142 See supra Part II.A (describing the enforcement authority of the FTC and its ability to 
enforce specific provisions of the Clayton Act); see also supra text accompanying note 30 
(discussing the FTC’s ability to enforce Section 2 of the Clayton Act).  See Mize, supra note 45, 
at 665 (arguing that that state legislatures and judiciaries must recognize that the FTC and 
plaintiff consumers have goals which are unaligned with dissimilar motives and resources).  
The “FTC has pursued broad standards in prosecuting consumer deceptions because of 
restraints on the [Federal Trade] Commission.”  Id. at 666.  See also supra Part II.A (providing 
the legal history of Section 5 and the reasons that Congress permitted the FTC to have broad 
enforcement of the FTC Act).  These state acts do not offer as much protection as the FTC Act 
and Section 5 because they do not permit broad authority to go after acts that violate both 
consumer protection laws and antitrust laws.  See supra Part II.B (explaining what  Little FTC 
Acts and UDAP Laws are); see also supra note 77 and accompanying text (listing the eleven 
deceptive acts and practices that consumers are permitted to bring claims against); see also 
supra note 80 and accompanying text (noting the jurisdictions that follow a laundry list 
approach to filing claims against deceptive acts). 
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their state’s laws.143  Second, the FTC has the ability to file for injunctive 
and monetary relief under Section 5.144  States, such as Arkansas, do not 
permit consumers to file for injunctive relief under state consumer 
protection laws.145  As a result, consumers are at risk of being harmed by 
the same deceptive act or practice twice.146  Therefore, state consumer laws 
are qualitatively different than Section 5 and a private right of action 
should be implemented into the FTC Act. 
Further, having a private right of action under state consumer 
protection laws benefits consumers in two ways.147  State consumer 
protection laws allow consumers to receive statutory damages, treble 
damages, and punitive damages.148  Further, the majority of states do not 
require that a consumer show that he reasonably relied on the defendant’s 
alleged deceptive act or statement.149  These statutes provide a benefit 
because they make it easier for the consumer to prevail on a claim and 
                                                 
143 See supra note 54 and accompanying text (arguing that it has been argued that the FTC 
has the authority to prosecute pure Section 5 violations, which antitrust laws do not touch); 
see also supra Part II.A (discussing the FTC’s authority to enforce more than the express 
provisions in the FTC Act such as antitrust law violations, Clayton Act violations, and 
foreign antitrust laws). 
144 See supra note 29 and accompanying text (describing the FTC’s authority to file for 
injunctive relief in federal court, which was provided due to the passing of the Alaska 
Pipeline Act); supra Part II.A (providing examples of the relief that is afforded to the FTC as 
a result of a violation of the FTC Act such as injunctive relief, fines, cease and desist orders, 
and civil penalties for violating an order issued by the FTC). 
145 See 2011 REVIEW, supra note 2, at 259 (asserting that “[a]lthough private plaintiffs can 
seek money damages, injunctive relief is unavailable to private plaintiffs under the 
[Arkansas Deceptive Trade and Practices Act]”, however the Arkansas Attorney General can 
file for injunctive relief); see also supra Part II.B (explaining the remedies afforded to 
consumers under state consumer protection law). 
146 See 2011 REVIEW, supra note 2, at 259 (proving that consumer plaintiffs are not provided 
the right to issue injunctions under state consumer protection laws, which could result in a 
consumer being harmed by the same act twice); supra Part II.B (providing the history and 
components of state consumer protection laws and noting the relief that is provided for 
consumers under these laws). 
147 See supra notes 82–83 and accompanying text (analogizing between state consumer 
protection acts in comparison to the FTC Act and concluding that the FTC Act provides the 
FTC with broad enforcement capabilities, whereas, state consumer protection statutes do not 
provide broad protection for consumers). 
148 See S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 37-24-31 (2016) (explaining the ability for consumers to file an 
action for recovery of actual damages suffered as a result of being adversely affected by a 
deceptive act or practice); Toward Greater Equality, supra note 67, at 1625 (describing uniform 
UDAP laws along with the damages that are available for consumers under state laws). 
149 See Mize, supra note 45, at 657–58 (asserting that because consumers do not need to 
prove intent under state consumer protection laws, the consumer benefits because it is easier 
to show that a consumer was harmed without needing to show that the defendant aimed at 
defrauding the consumer); supra Part II.A (offering the tests that the FTC uses to determine 
whether an act is unfair or deceptive in violation of Section 5 and determining that the FTC 
is responsible for proving that the defendant intended to cause harm). 
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recover damages since they remove the difficult requirement of proving 
that the consumer relied on the defendant’s representation.150 
State consumer protection laws also do not permit consumers the 
ability to enforce the FTC’s past Section 5 decisions.151  As a result, private 
consumers cannot rely on a determination from the FTC or an ALJ that a 
deceptive act or practice occurred.152  This places a burden for private 
consumers to establish a claim that an individual or a corporation violated 
state law instead of being able to utilize an FTC decision.153  In addition to 
consumers not having an express private right of action under Section 5, 
                                                 
150 See Mize, supra note 45, at 657–58 (arguing that Little FTC Acts allow consumers to 
benefit by avoiding the difficulty of proving intent).  For example, under the Tennessee 
Consumer Protection Act, a consumer needs to prove that a representation in question falls 
within a broad category, but does not need to prove that the defendant intentionally 
misrepresented a product in order to mislead a consumer and obtain an unfair advantage 
over the consumer.  Id. at 664.  This standard makes it easier for a consumer to prevail on a 
consumer protection statute because the consumer only needs to show that the defendant 
acted in a manner that violated a statute, but does not need to show the intent of the 
defendant to defraud.  Id. 
151 See Butler & Wright, supra note 63, at 165 (distinguishing the FTC Act from state 
consumer protection laws).  Legal scholars argue that FTC enforcement and the combination 
of private rights of action offered under state consumer protection laws provides for 
generous remedies to consumers with a lack of expertise, and expansive definitions of illegal 
conduct, which catalyze consumers to file lawsuits.  Id. at 166.  However, because consumers 
are not permitted to enforce the FTC’s decisions regarding Section 5 violations, consumers 
are not able to rely on the expertise of the FTC.  See Mize, supra note 45, at 665 (arguing that 
“state legislatures and judiciaries must recognize that the FTC and plaintiff consumers have 
dissimilar goals which are unaligned with dissimilar motives and resources”).  See also 
Villafranco & Blynn, supra note 7, at 22 (bringing to light the difficulty for consumers who 
try to piggyback off of an FTC claim).  Critics argue that not being able to piggyback off of 
an FTC decision is unfavorable for consumer because there has been an increase of class 
actions filed by consumers, but courts especially in California, New Jersey, and Florida, 
dismissed the claims.  Id.  These claims are increasingly filed by advertisers in the food and 
dietary supplement industries, however, the FTC Act does not permit a private right of 
action, therefore, any class action brought by a private litigant relying entirely on allegations 
made by the FTC , or attempts to draw an alleged violation of the FTC Act, cannot stand.  Id. 
at 22–24. 
152 See Villafranco & Blynn, supra note 7, at 24 (criticizing the fact that consumers are not 
able to file a piggyback class action lawsuit based off an FTC ruling because consumers are 
not afforded a private right of action and cannot allege an FTC Act violation or rely on one 
that has been previously filed by the FTC); supra Part II.A (describing the enforcement 
authority of the FTC and its history, including the fact that consumers are not afforded a 
private right of action under the Act, and thus, consumers are not able to enforce past 
decisions from the commission or ALJ’s ruling on behalf of the commission). 
153 See Villafranco & Blynn, supra note 7, at 24 (expressing that as a result of consumers not 
having a private right of action, they are not allowed to piggyback off of earlier precedent 
established by the FTC); supra Part II.A (introducing the fact that the FTC is currently the 
only entity available to enforce the FTC Act, and thus, consumers are not able to rely on a 
past FTC or ALJ decision barring a deceptive act or practice). 
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courts have incorrectly held that consumers do not have an implied 
private right of action under the FTC Act.154 
B. Why the Holding of Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corporation is Incorrect 
Holloway incorrectly held that the FTC Act does not create a right of 
action for private parties because the court did not review the five factors 
for implying a private right of action derived from J.I. Case Company.155  
Further, the Holloway Court incorrectly rejected the reasoning that private 
rights of actions can provide meaningful consumer protection against 
fraud.156  Holloway also failed to take into account that Congress passed 
the WLA after the Court decided Moore.157  The court should have reached 
a different conclusion had all of the factors been taken into consideration, 
                                                 
154 See infra Part III.B (analyzing the holding in Holloway as incorrect because it determined 
that only two of the five factors of the case needed to be analyzed and the court erred when 
it interpreted Congress’ intent of not overturning Moore, which resulted in the finding that 
Congress intended the FTC to be the sole enforcer of Section 5); supra note 6 and 
accompanying text (introducing the Holloway decision and its impact on how courts decided 
the issue of whether consumers are afforded a private right of action under Section 5).  See 
also infra Part IV.A (proposing the addition of language into the existing FTC Act to include 
an express private right of action for consumers). 
155 See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 987 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (holding that 
private actions to vindicate rights under the FTC Act cannot be upheld because a private 
right cannot be implied and Congress intended for the FTC to have the sole authority to 
enforce the FTC Act).  The case states: 
The core of our decision rejecting implication of a private action lies in 
our analysis of the ramifications of the asserted private remedy and a 
comparison of these with the policies and objectives sought to be 
advanced by Congress.  This analysis is conjoined with a further 
discussion of factors (3) and (5), legislative intent and ineffectiveness of 
the means provided by Congress for effectuating its objective. 
Id. at 989.  Holloway did not state a reason for not balancing the other three factors for 
implying a private right of action.  Id.  See supra note 106 and accompanying text (listing the 
five factors for implying a private right of action that were derived from the Supreme Court). 
156 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 997 (reasoning that because the court has limited judicial 
constructs and Congress balanced the FTC’s ability for consumer protection, the court 
needed to be careful in analyzing whether plaintiffs are afforded a private right of action 
under the FTC Act); supra Part II.A (introducing the reason for enacting the FTC Act and for 
passing the WLA, which was for stronger consumer protection and for allowing the FTC 
broad discretion to define unfair or deceptive conduct); supra Part III.A (distinguishing the 
importance of having a private right of action based off an analysis of how consumers benefit 
from having a private right of action under state consumer protection laws). 
157 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 997 (arguing that the court’s judicial latitude for implying a 
private right of action is limited because when creating the FTC Act, Congress balanced 
society’s need for the act with the FTC’s ability to enforce the act, therefore the court must 
carefully analyze the issue); supra Part II.A (introducing the WLA and the reasons for why 
they were created); supra Part II.C (providing the reasoning for Holloway’s decision). 
Valparaiso University Law Review, Vol. 50, No. 1 [2015], Art. 7
https://scholar.valpo.edu/vulr/vol50/iss1/7
2015] The FTC Won’t Let Me Be 257 
and had the court in Holloway been given the benefit of correctly reviewing 
the WLA as they applied to Moore’s holding.158 
First, Holloway should have examined the first factor of the rationale 
for implying a private right of action because it was satisfied in the case.159  
The factor rests upon whether there is a “federal statutory or 
constitutional prohibition against the acts complained of[;]” furthermore, 
the factor is necessary for a comprehensive analysis of determining 
whether a private right of action should be implied.160  Section 5, a federal 
statute, prohibits unfair or deceptive acts in or affecting the marketplace 
and the plaintiffs in Holloway complained that the defendant’s acts 
violated Section 5.161  Therefore, since there is a federal statute prohibiting 
the acts complained of, the first factor was satisfied, and because the court 
did not examine this factor, Holloway erred in its analysis as each factor 
should be analyzed.162 
The court also should have implied a private right of action by 
examining factor two of the rationale for implying a private right of action 
in its analysis.163  First, the implication is based on the reasoning that a 
                                                 
158 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 997 (stating that Congress passed the WLA when Moore 
interpreted the FTC Act to mean that the FTC, not private parties, must bring Section 5 
actions); supra Part II.C (explaining Moore’s holding that the FTC must initiate an action for 
recovery under the FTC Act); see also supra Part II.A (laying out the history of federal 
consumer protection law and specifically after Moore, when the WLA were passed); supra 
Part II.C (listing the facts of Holloway, the courts holding, its reasoning, and how the court 
analyzed only two of the five factors for implying a private right of action without stating 
why). 
159 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 989 (introducing the first factor for implying a private right of 
action and cautioning that although the factors are necessary, they do not automatically 
warrant the implication of a private right of action); supra Part II.C (providing Holloway’s 
reasoning for determining that a private right of action did not exist, and how the court did 
not state a reason for not analyzing the remaining three factors of implying a private right). 
160 Holloway, 485 F.2d at 989; see also supra Part II.C (giving the facts and case history of 
Holloway and the theories that the complaint was grounded based on the defendant’s 
advertisement that the product was better than another equally effective product). 
161 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 988 (stating the cause of action against the defendants); supra 
Part II.A (providing the history and components of a Section 5 violation); supra Part II.C 
(introducing plaintiff’s complaint in Holloway where the plaintiffs alleged that defendants 
alleged that Excedrin was a more effective pain relieving agent than aspirin in a false, 
deceptive, and materially misleading way, and that as a result on relying on the defendant’s 
advertisements, the plaintiffs were harmed to their pecuniary loss). 
162 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 989 (determining that in its analysis Holloway was only 
analyzing factors three and five of the rationale for implying a private right of action along 
with a discussion about the legislative intent and ineffectiveness of the means provided by 
Congress for influencing the purpose of the FTC Act). 
163 See Judicial Refusal to Imply a Private Right of Action Under the FTCA, 1974 DUKE L.J. 506, 
508 (1974) [hereinafter Judicial Refusal] (arguing that even though the FTC Act does not 
expressly provide for a private right of action, one should have been implied due to the 
“established principle that a party has a cause of action when damaged by conduct that 
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litigant has a cause of action when damaged by conduct that violates a 
statute enacted for his or her protection despite the fact that the FTC Act 
does not expressly create a private right of action.164  Holloway did not 
address nor take into account whether a plaintiff would have effective 
redress if a private right of action is not asserted.165  The court also did not 
weigh the second factor of implying a private right of action, which is 
incorrect.166  The second factor requires that the defendant fit into the class 
that statutory compliance has been imposed, and because Section 5 
prohibits unfair or deceptive acts or practices the defendant falls within 
that class.167  Accordingly, the Holloway court should have taken into 
                                                 
violates a statute.”); supra note 106 and accompanying text (listing the factors for implying a 
private right of action).  Factor two is an “inclusion of the defendant in the class upon which 
the duty of statutory compliance has been imposed.”  Holloway, 485 F.2d at 989. 
164 See Judicial Refusal, supra note 163, at 508 (describing Judge Solomon’s dissent from 
Carlson v. Coca-Cola Company).  Judge Solomon argued in Carlson that even though the FTC 
Act does not provide for a private right of action expressly, “the court should have implied 
such a right based on the principle that a party has a cause of action when damaged by 
conduct that violates a statute.”  Id.; see also Carlson v. Coca-Cola Co., 483 F.2d 279, 283 (9th 
Cir. 1973) (stating that consumers are left with nowhere to turn for an effective remedy 
against dishonest merchants if there is not a private right of action under Section 5); supra 
Part II.A (outlining the components of a Section 5 violation and the practices that the federal 
statute prohibits). 
165 See Holloway, 485 F.2d 988 (remaining silent on the issue of consumer redress although 
the appellants sought declaratory and injunctive relief, together with compensatory and 
punitive damages).  See also infra Part III.C (analyzing the difference between state and 
federal consumer protection statutes and concluding that consumers benefit from having a 
private right of action under state consumer statutes; therefore, the court should have 
reached a different result if Holloway considered the benefits of giving consumers a private 
right of action along with analyzing the five factors for implying a private right of action and 
congressional intent for enacting the WLA). 
166 See Holloway, 485 F.2d 988 (providing that the defendant, Bristol-Myers, represented a 
variety of advertisements in a false, deceptive, and materially misleading manner).  This 
deceptive act by Bristol-Meyers is exactly the type of act that Section 5 prohibits (unfair or 
deceptive acts), which would place the defendant into the category that statutory compliance 
with Section 5 requires.  Id.; see also supra Part II.A (providing the components of a Section 5 
violation and its legal history); supra note 106 and accompanying text (listing the five factors 
for implying a private right of action).  The second factor includes the defendant in the class 
upon which the duty of statutory compliance has been imposed.  Supra note 106 and 
accompanying text; see also Carlson, 483 F.2d at 283 (opining that a plaintiff has a cause of 
action when harmed from a defendant’s conduct); Judicial Refusal, supra note 163, at 508 
(arguing that a cause of action should be implied in Holloway because a party has a cause of 
action against harmful conduct). 
167 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 987–88 (noting that Bristol-Meyers made representation in a 
variety of advertisements in a false, deceptive, and materially misleading manner); see also 
15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012) (providing the statutory authority for Section 5); supra Part II.C 
(describing the facts of Holloway); supra note 106 and accompanying text (listing the factors 
for implying a private right of action). 
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account the second factor, and as a result, should have found that an 
inference for a private right of action did exist.168 
Further, the court did not account for the fourth factor of the rationale 
and incorrectly reasoned that there was not an implication for a private 
right under Section 5.169  This factor should have also been analyzed 
because the case satisfied the factor, and thus, would have likely resulted 
in finding an implied private right.170  The defendant fulfilled the factor 
because the defendant proximately caused harm to the plaintiff by 
breaching its duty under Section 5 when it falsely advertised the 
capabilities of Excedrin.171  Thus, the defendant directly caused plaintiff’s 
injury by causing plaintiff to rely upon the truthfulness of the statements 
made in its advertisement, satisfying the fourth factor.172 
Accordingly, Holloway reached the wrong result because it did not 
balance the five factors of the rationale for implying a private right of 
action respectively.173  Had Holloway balanced the five factors for implying 
a private right of action, the court likely would have come up with a 
                                                 
168 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 989 (“This analysis is conjoined with a further discussion of 
factors (3) and (5), legislative intent and ineffectiveness of the means provided by Congress 
for effectuating its objective.”).  Although the five factors for implying a private right of 
action from Borak, they are not sufficient conditions to automatically provide an implication 
for a private right of action according to Holloway.  Id.  However, if the second factor would 
have been taken into account in Holloway’s reasoning, it is likely that a different result would 
have occurred and there would be an implication of a private right of action.  Id. 
169 See id. (discussing that Holloway will analyze factors three and five along with the 
congressional means of ensuring that the legislative intent for enacting the FTC Act is carried 
out).  Holloway remained silent on analyzing factor four.  Id.; see also supra Part II.C (describing 
the representations that the plaintiffs relied upon in Holloway).  Although Holloway does not 
expressly state that defendant was the proximate cause of plaintiffs injury, it can be inferred 
that but for defendant’s acts, plaintiff would not have been harmed by the advertisements.  
Supra Part II.C.  Additionally, plaintiff’s harm is a foreseeable harm that would occur as a 
result of defendant’s breach of duty when creating advertisements that are not false or 
misleading.  Supra Part II.C. 
170 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 989 (noting that the court will analyze factors three and five, 
but not four, and that the court will discuss the legislative intent and ineffectiveness of the 
means provided by Congress for effectuating the purpose of the FTC Act). 
171 See id. at 988 (introducing plaintiff’s complaint and the specific representations the court 
relied upon); supra Part II.C (describing the complaint and the defendant’s assertions that 
plaintiff relied on, specifically discussing that plaintiffs relied upon defendant’s assertions 
that Excedrin is a more effective pain reliever than common aspirin). 
172 See supra Part II.C (reviewing the facts of Holloway, specifically discussing the claim that 
Excedrin relieved pain better than common aspirin, which the plaintiffs relied on to their 
financial loss, indicating that the defendant proximately caused plaintiffs’ injury). 
173 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 989 (noting that only factors three and five were going to be 
analyzed, while not stating why the other three additional factors would not be taken into 
account); see also supra note 106 and accompanying text (listing the Borak factors derived from 
the Supreme Court to determine how to analyze an implication for a private right of action). 
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different result.174  Although the five factors, if found together, do not 
automatically warrant the implication of a private right, they are 
necessary for a comprehensive analysis, and if sufficiently balanced 
would likely result in implying a private right of action.175 
Further, the court’s reasoning merely provided the subsequent legal 
history of the FTC Act and WLA.176  The court narrowly reasoned that 
because Congress made no move to alter the Moore interpretation 
precluding private enforcement of Section 5, it intended the FTC’s sole 
enforcement of the WLA.177  At its core, the Holloway Court’s reasoning 
was incorrect.178  Simply because Congress made no move to alter the 
Supreme Court’s interpretation of Moore does not mean that Congress did 
not intend for consumers to not have a private right of action under 
Section 5. 
Congress enacted the WLA as a response to a growing concern for 
consumer protection.179  In its analysis, Holloway failed to address the 
                                                 
174 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 989 (stating that the court was only going to balance two out 
of the five factors for implying a private right of action along with an analysis of the 
congressional means for effectuating the purpose of the FTC Act, and discussing the 
ramifications of the asserted private right of action while balancing them against policy 
reasons for enacting the FTC); supra Part II.C (reiterating the reasoning for Holloway’s 
determination that a private right of action does not exist under the FTC Act). 
175 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 989 (determining that three out of the five factors for implying 
a private right of action were not going to be balanced, and admitting that all of the factors 
are necessary for implying a private right of action, but leaving out the reasoning for why 
the other factors would not be balanced). 
176 See id. at 990–97 (providing the legal history of the FTC Act starting from the 1914 statute 
and continuing through the WLA of 1938 and concluding at the United States Supreme Court 
decision from Moore).  See also supra Part II.A (introducing the reasoning for enacting the FTC 
Act and the congressional intent for passing the WLA to the Act, which was due largely in 
part to provide the FTC with greater authority to enforce the FTC Act as a result of the needs 
for stronger consumer protection). 
177 See Holloway, 485 F.2d at 997 (stating that “[t]he conclusion is inescapable that Congress 
intended enforcement of the WLA to rest wholly and exclusively with the FTC, following 
the pattern laid down in the 1914 Act.”); supra Part II.A (listing the reasoning for enacting the 
WLA and the date that they were enacted, which was after the Moore decision); supra Part 
II.C (reviewing the Moore decision and the court’s reasoning for not allowing a consumer 
private right of action). 
178 See supra Part II.A (describing the enactment of the WLA and that they were enacted to 
increase consumer protection); supra Part II.C (noting that Holloway reasoned that because 
Congress did not alter the Moore decision, Congress intended that a private right of action 
did not exist under Section 5; however, the court failed to distinguish that the WLA were 
enacted after Moore, and thus, Congress intended for stronger consumer protection which 
would occur through private rights of actions). 
179 See supra Part II.A (discussing the history of federal consumer protection law and that 
Congress responded to a growing need for stronger consumer protection by enacting the 
WLA to provide the FTC with more enforcement power, but it did not expressly state that 
the FTC is the only entity capable of enforcing the WLA or the FTC Act). 
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perceived increase in demand for consumer protection legislation.180  This 
reasoning is flawed because Congress did not expressly prohibit private 
actions under Section 5.181  Section 5 remains silent on whether consumers 
have a private right of action.182  To that end, the FTC Act does not 
expressly state that the FTC should be the sole enforcer of the FTC Act, 
but merely permits the FTC to enforce the provisions.183 
The court also did not take into account that Moore was decided prior 
to the enactment of the WLA.184  The WLA evidences part of the growing 
concern for the protection of consumers, which suggests a private right of 
                                                 
180 See supra Part II.B (describing the passage of Little FTC Acts and UDAP Laws as a result 
of states needing protection similar to that of federal legislation due to an increase in demand 
from the consuming public); see also supra Part II.A (elaborating on the passage of the WLA 
for the purposes of providing the FTC with more broad and flexible power to enforce the 
FTC Act).  Currently, there is still an increase in demand for stronger consumer protection 
as evidenced by Congress creating the CFPB.  See supra Part II.B (introducing the creation of 
the CFPB and the reasoning for its enactment). 
181 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1)(2012) (providing the statutory authority for the FTC to prohibit 
unfair or deceptive acts).  Nowhere in the FTC Act itself does it state that consumers are 
precluded from bringing an action alleging Section 5 violations.  Id.   Courts such as Holloway 
have tried to interpret congressional intent by analyzing the enactment of consumer 
protection legislation.  See Holloway v. Bristol Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 989 (D.C. Cir. 1973) 
(stating the reasoning for not implying a private right of action based on balancing the 
ramifications of a private right of action and comparing it with the policies and objectives 
sought to be advanced by Congress when it enacted the FTC Act and provided the FTC 
authority to enforce it). 
182 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(a)(1) (describing the statutory authority that the FTC uses to bring a 
claim under Section 5, but remaining silent on whether consumers are precluded from 
bringing a claim under the federal law). 
183  See id. § 45(b) (containing the statutory framework for Section 5).  The statute provides: 
Whenever the Commission shall have reason to believe that any such 
person, partnership, or corporation has been or is using any unfair 
method of competition or unfair or deceptive act or practice in or 
affecting commerce, and if it shall appear to the Commission that a 
proceeding by it in respect thereof would be in to the interest of the 
public, it shall issue and serve upon such person partnership or 
corporation a complaint stating its charges . . . . 
Id.  Nowhere in this statute does it state expressly that consumers are not permitted to file an 
action.  Id.; see supra Part II.A (introducing the authority of the FTC to enforce the FTC Act 
and the power provided to the FTC by Congress). 
184 See Judicial Refusal, supra note 163, at 511 (describing the history of the WLA and how it 
relates to the Moore decision).  “Although Moore . . . clearly show[s] that no private right of 
action was found to exist under the original FTCA, [it] was decided before the enactment of 
the 1938 Wheeler-Lea amendments[.]”  Id.; see also supra Part II.A (listing the timeline of the 
enactment of the WLA and the reasons for its creation).  The WLA were passed in 1938 in 
order for the FTC to enforce unfair or deceptive conduct in addition to prohibiting 
anticompetitive behavior.  Pollack & Teichner, supra note 87, at 127.  Moore was decided in 
1926, a considerable amount of time earlier than the enactment of the WLA.  Moore v. N.Y. 
Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593, 593 (1926). 
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action should be implied under the amended FTC Act.185  Had the court 
considered this fact, the end result likely would be different because 
discussion on the timing of the WLA would have revealed that Congress 
intended more protection for consumers instead of less protection.186  
While Holloway incorrectly did not imply a private right of action, 
Guernsey correctly determined that a private right of action was necessary 
for consumers under Section 5.187 
C. Why Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest is Correct 
First, Guernsey correctly determined that the FTC’s ability to deter 
consumer fraud is questionable because the FTC cannot resolve every 
individual consumer complaint it receives.188  Since the FTC receives 
numerous complaints each year, it is impossible for the agency to resolve 
each and every consumer dispute.189  Having a private right of action 
                                                 
185 See Judicial Refusal, supra note 163, at 511–12 (noting congressional concerns regarding 
consumer protection, and as a result of these concerns, Congress enacted the WLA); see also 
supra Part II.A (describing the passage of the WLA to provide the FTC with more power in 
enforcing the FTC Act). 
186 See supra Part II.A (highlighting the legal history of Section 5 of the FTC Act and that 
the reason for enacting Section 5 was for the protection of consumers).  See also Butler & 
Wright, supra note 63, at 164 (stating that during the 1960’s, the American public and election 
officials increased demand for consumer protection litigation, which was thirteen years prior 
to the decision in Holloway).  This change shows that there was an increasing concern in 
America for consumer protection laws, which lead some to believe that Congress was 
starting a trend for more stringent consumer protection law.  Id.  Additionally, during the 
time that Holloway was decided, states began enacting and utilizing Little FTC Acts and 
UDAP laws, showing an increase in demand for consumer protection law.  Id. at 165.  See also 
supra Part II.B (providing the history of Little FTC Acts and UDAP laws). 
187 See Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582, 588–89 (N.D. Ind. 1976) 
(holding that plaintiffs had a cause of action alleging Section 5 of the FTC Act claims if the 
claim was brought by a plaintiff injured by defendant who violated a cease and desist letter 
issued by the FTC, and reasoning that the purpose of the FTC would be effectuated if a 
consumer was able to initiate a lawsuit against an act that the FTC previously deemed 
unlawful). 
188 See id. at 586 (determining that if the FTC already issued a cease and desist order against 
an unfair or deceptive act, and defendants subsequently violate that order, plaintiffs have a 
cause of action).  The court determined that most defrauded customers do not have a remedy, 
because the FTC cannot act in more than a small fraction of cases of deceit.  Id. 
189 See id. (arguing that when the case was decided, the FTC received over 9000 consumer 
complaints a year, but was only able to investigate and act upon a small number of those 
complaints);  see also supra Part II.C (describing in depth the facts surrounding the FTC’s lack 
of enforcement when the case was decided).  Recently, in 2013, the Consumer Sentinel 
Network—a unique cyber tool that the FTC utilizes for receiving consumer complaints—
received over two million complaints during 2013.  FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION, CONSUMER 
SENTINEL NETWORK DATA BOOK FOR JANUARY–DECEMBER 2013 3 (Feb. 2014), 
http://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/reports/consumer-sentinel-network-data-
book-january-december-2013/sentinel-cy2013.pdf [http://perma.cc/H2WX-XN8N].  Fifty-
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under Section 5 would result in stronger consumer protection because if a 
consumer has a legitimate claim, the consumer could obtain relief without 
having to go through the FTC.190  Congress allowing the CFPB to enforce 
acts that are substantially similar to those that violate Section 5 questions 
the FTC’s competency in resolving Section 5 complaints.191  The enactment 
shows that Congress acknowledged the fact that stronger enforcement of 
Section 5 needs to occur.192  Thus, Guernsey correctly concluded that the 
FTC, in its current state, cannot effectively resolve consumer complaints, 
and in order for the FTC Act to be used as intended by Congress, 
consumers should be afforded the ability to bring a claim against a Section 
5 violator.193 
Guernsey also properly applied the doctrine of implication.194  The 
court correctly concluded that the plaintiffs cleared the first hurdle of 
private enforcement when the defendants violated a cease and desist 
order issued by the FTC and harmed the plaintiffs by actions that were 
                                                 
five percent of those claims were fraud complaints.  Id.  In 2013, only sixty-one percent of 
consumers reporting a fraud related complaint also reported an amount paid to them as 
compensation for their claim.  Id.  This study indicates that the FTC could use additional 
assistance in enforcing Section 5 claims because a little over half of the consumers who filed 
a complaint with the FTC reported that they were compensated for their claim.  Id.; see supra 
Part II.A (describing the enactment of the CFPB and the reasons for its creation).  
Additionally, Congress’ recent enactment of the CFPB indicates that the FTC is not 
responding to consumer complaints, so Congress created an additional government agency 
to enforce acts that are substantially similar to acts that the FTC enforces under Section 5.  See 
Pridgen, supra note 60, at 415 (criticizing the FTC’s current enforcement methods). 
190  See infra Part IV (providing a private right of action in Section 5). 
191 See supra Part II.A (listing the reasoning for permitting the CFPB with the power to go 
after unfair and deceptive acts); see also Pridgen, supra note 60, at 415 (arguing that the CFPB 
was created to be a stronger enforcement power than the FTC); supra note 60 and 
accompanying text (noting that critics have argued that the CFPB was created due in part to 
a growing realization by Congress that consumers needed more effective enforcement of 
consumer protection laws). 
192 See Pridgen, supra note 60, at 415 (discussing the fact that Congress created the CFPB to 
acknowledge the FTC’s ineffectiveness at addressing consumer complaints as a result of an 
increase in consumer complaints based on lenders who made promises to homebuyers that 
were not kept and resulted in injury to consumers). 
193 See supra Part II.A (describing the history of the FTC Act and the purpose for enacting 
it due to an increase in demand for the protection of the marketplace); see also ABA 
ANTITRUST SECTION, VOL. I, supra note 29, at 11 (reviewing the history of the Covington bill, 
which catalyzed the enactment of Section 5(e) and allows the FTC to regulate anticompetitive 
behavior). 
194 See Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 586 (listing the components of the doctrine of implication); 
see also supra Part II.C (elaborating in detail how the Guernsey applied the doctrine of 
implication and that the court found that a private right of action should exist in order to 
accomplish the purpose of the FTC Act based on the fact that the defendants violated an 
order, which the FTC issued due to the defendant’s unlawful conduct). 
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deemed previously unlawful by the FTC.195  Thus, the plaintiffs were 
placed into the class of subjects that Section 5 was designed to protect.196  
Guernsey harnessed the purpose of the FTC Act by allowing the 
defendants to continue with their lawsuit because the FTC had already 
properly determined that the company’s acts were unlawful.197 
Further, Guernsey determined that plaintiffs have a private right of 
action under Section 5 in light of the statute’s purpose because Congress 
intended Section 5 to strengthen consumer protection.198  The Indiana 
court determined that Section 5’s purpose is to deter consumer harm and 
by permitting consumers to have a private right of action, the purpose of 
the FTC Act was achieved.199  Accordingly, Guernsey properly concluded 
                                                 
195 See Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 588 (asserting that since the FTC had already found the 
defendant’s behavior unlawful in violation of Section 5, the first hurdle that the FTC—with 
its broad overview of the national economy—is in a better position than a private litigant to 
gauge the injury of a deceptive practice will cause to the public has been cleared and that the 
court should rule in favor of the consuming public); supra Part II.C (noting one of the reasons 
for Holloway’s decision of not permitting a private right of action based on the theory that the 
FTC is in a better position than consumers to determine whether the benefit of stopping 
conduct that violates Section 5 outweighs the cost of stopping the conduct). 
196 See Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 589 (holding that the plaintiffs had a cause of action under 
Section 5 based on the fact that the defendants violated an earlier cease and desist order 
issued by the FTC); supra Part II.C (describing the reasoning of Guernsey when it determined 
that the FTC had already used its position with an extensive overview of the national 
economy when it deemed the defendant’s conduct unlawful and that as a result, plaintiffs 
cleared the first hurdle of private enforcement). 
197 See Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 588–89 (determining that Section 5 was passed to deter 
fraud and unfair practices and that permitting the plaintiffs to have a cause of action under 
Section 5 properly executes the FTC Act).  By permitting the plaintiffs to continue on with 
their lawsuit, Guernsey reasoned that it carried out the FTC Act because it ensured that the 
defendants complied with the FTC cease and desist order, which is the result of behavior 
that the FTC had previously found unlawful.  Id. at 587–88. 
198 See id. at 588 (reasoning that the defendants fit within the scope of the FTC’s cease and 
desist order, and thus, allowing the plaintiffs to file an action against them for violating the 
order invoked Section 5 because the defendants violated a statute enacted for the plaintiff’s 
protection); supra Part II.A (describing congressional intent for enacting Section 5, and the 
reasoning for its enactment, which was to provide the FTC with broad discretion to enforce 
unfair and deceptive acts and practices in addition to prohibiting unfair methods of 
competition); supra note 42 and accompanying text (providing the statutory framework of 
Section 5 that Congress created in order to deter individuals or corporations from using 
unfair methods of competition and unfair or deceptive acts or practices in commerce). 
199 See Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 588–89 (holding that plaintiffs had a cause of action under 
Section 5 based on the fact that the defendants violated a cease and desist order issued by 
the FTC); supra Part II.A (describing the legal history of Section 5 and the purpose for its 
enactment, which was for stronger consumer protection and to permit the FTC with broad 
enforcement powers to prohibit anticompetitive behavior and unfair or deceptive acts and 
practices that harm consumers); see also supra note 43 and accompanying text (introducing 
the history of Section 5 and the basis for its enactment which the Covington Bill proposed). 
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that the plaintiffs had a cause of action under Section 5 if injured by 
defendants who violated an earlier cease and desist order from the FTC.200 
Although Guernsey was a step in the right direction for private 
enforcement of Section 5, more action still needs to be taken.201  
Consumers should be afforded an express right to file a lawsuit against a 
deceptive or unfair act or practice.202  Due to the increased demand for 
consumer protection, as evidenced by the creation of the CFPB, and the 
lack of proper redress afforded to consumers, an amendment needs to be 
made to the FTC Act.203  Subsequently, the proposed amendment in Part 
IV implements a private right of action for consumers, and if passed by 
the legislature, would result in stronger protection for consumers.204 
IV. CONTRIBUTION 
A private right of action would effectively alleviate the problem for 
consumers who are left with limited state consumer protection law 
redress, even though there are consumer protection risks associated with 
having a private right of action under Section 5.205  The problem exists 
                                                 
200 See Guernsey, 408 F. Supp. at 589 (holding that private plaintiffs had a cause of action 
alleging Section 5 violations after they were harmed by a violation of an FTC cease and desist 
order); supra Part II.C (providing the facts of Guernsey, the holding, and the reasoning for the 
court’s decision). 
201 See supra Part II.C (introducing the facts, holding and reasoning for the Guernsey 
decision and how the court determined that plaintiffs had a cause of action based on the 
defendant’s violation of an earlier cease and desist order issued by the FTC); infra Part IV 
(proposing that an amendment be made to Section 5 by adding the phrase “consumer-
plaintiff” into the existing language of the FTC Act to create an express private right of action 
for consumers). 
202 See supra Part III.A (examining the discrepancies between state and federal consumer 
protection law and reaching the conclusion that consumers should be given the same 
enforcement capabilities as the FTC because state consumer protection laws do not offer the 
same broad enforcement as the FTC); infra Part IV.A (introducing a proposed amendment to 
the existing language of the FTC Act to include an express private right of action for 
consumers); infra Part IV.B (reiterating the fact that consumers should be afforded an express 
private right of action under Section 5 and providing commentary on the proposed 
amendment to the language of Section 5 of the FTC Act). 
203 See supra Part II.A (elaborating on the history of the CFPB and the reasons for its 
enactment, which is due in part to the FTC’s inability to respond to consumer complaints 
that are substantially similar to those that violate Section 5, and because of the harm that 
occurred to consumers as a result of the deceptive behavior of lenders during the mortgage 
scandal in 2009). 
204 See infra Part IV (proposing an amendment be made to 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012)).  The author 
has proposed the changes in italics. 
205 See supra Part II.B (describing current state consumer protection law); infra Part IV.B 
(suggesting potential risks associated with having a private right of action under Section 5). 
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because there is not an express private right of action under Section 5.206  
Congress needs to amend the FTC Act and implement a private right of 
action to provide consumers with the ability to file a lawsuit alleging 
Section 5 violations.207 
To begin, Part IV.A suggests that these amendments include the 
phrase “consumer-plaintiff” within the existing language of the FTC Act, 
which will allow consumers to file a lawsuit in any federal district court 
appropriate under venue rules.208  Second, the amendment proposes 
implementing the phrase “consumer-plaintiff” into the existing FTC Act 
to allow consumers to receive the same redress that is currently available 
to the FTC.  Finally, Part IV.B provides commentary regarding the 
proposed amendment and how critics may react to the change.209  
Furthermore, the adoption of the proposed amendment would render the 
Holloway and Guernsey decisions moot because courts will no longer need 
to determine if a private right of action under Section 5 should be 
implied.210 
A. Proposed Amendments to 15 U.S.C. § 45 
In order to accomplish the changes necessary, below is sample of how 
a private right of action can be implemented into Section 5 of the FTC 
Act.211  The phrase “consumer-plaintiff” should be added after the word 
“Commission” throughout Section 5 to create an express right of action 
for consumers under Section 5.212  A brief sample of how the FTC Act 
would read is as follows: 
§ 45 Unfair methods of competition unlawful; 
prevention by Commission 
(b) Proceeding by Commission; modifying and 
setting aside orders 
Whenever the Commission or consumer-plaintiff shall 
have reason to believe that any such person, 
                                                 
206 See supra Part II.C (reviewing court decisions that have held that there is not a private 
right of action available to consumers). 
207 See infra Part IV (composing an amendment to Section 5 of the FTC Act and providing 
commentary about what the amendment means for consumers). 
208 See infra Part IV.A (providing an example of how a private right of action can be 
implemented within the existing FTC Act). 
209 See infra Part IV.B (suggesting issues that may arise from providing consumers with a 
private right of action). 
210 See supra Part III (examining the Holloway and Guernsey decisions). 
211 In an attempt to preserve space, the author used an excerpt of the Section 5 as an 
example of how an express private right of action can be incorporated. 
212 See infra Part IV.A (proposing an amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012)). 
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partnership, or corporation has been or is using any 
unfair method of competition or unfair or deceptive 
act or practice in or affecting commerce, and if it shall 
appear to the Commission or consumer-plaintiff that a 
proceeding by it in respect hereof would be to the 
interest of the public, it shall issue and serve upon 
such person, partnership, or corporation a complaint 
stating its charges in that respect . . . 213 
B. Commentary 
The proposed amendments to the statute correct two different issues 
within the FTC Act.  First, the amendment expressly permits consumers 
to file an action in any appropriate federal court pursuant to the 
jurisdictional requirements under the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.  
Second, the amendment allows for consumers to receive the same redress 
as the FTC.  Together, these amendments allow consumers to effectively 
and adequately allege a Section 5 violation, and receive appropriate 
redress.214 
Amending Section 5 of the FTC Act to create a private right of action 
will strengthen consumer protection by allowing consumers to file a 
lawsuit against a violator in lieu of going through the FTC.  Under the 
amended FTC Act, a consumer can independently file a complaint against 
a violator.215  An express private right of action will allow consumers to 
enforce past FTC decisions, which will enable them to use precedent 
already established by the FTC to stop the act from happening.  In turn, 
this would ensure that consumers are able to use precedent already 
established to stop the act from happening on a case-by-case basis.216  
Additionally, adding an express private right of action strengthens 
consumer protection because it ensures that all legitimate consumer 
complaints are being resolved.217  Finally, the proposed amendments 
require that consumers be afforded the same enforcement powers as the 
FTC, which means they will be entitled to receive the same redress as the 
                                                 
213 15 U.S.C. § 45(b). 
214 See supra Part II.A (describing the redress available to the FTC for a violation of Section 
5).  The same redress would be available to consumers if an express private right of action is 
granted. 
215 See supra Part IV.A (proposing that the phrase “consumer-plaintiff” be added within 
the existing language of Section 5). 
216 See supra Part III.A (arguing that the consumers are not able to enforce past FTC 
decisions which affects not only individual lawsuits, but class action lawsuits as well). 
217 See supra Part III.C (analyzing the lack of enforcement of consumer complaints by the 
FTC due to the increase in the amount of complaints and the inability of the FTC to effectively 
respond to them). 
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FTC.218  In short, this amendment permits a consumer to receive a uniform 
penalty for each violation, request an injunction, and recover $10,000 from 
a person or corporation who violates an issued order.219 
Although the proposed amendments strengthen consumer 
protection, critics may argue that courts do not have the same expertise as 
the FTC to decide which actions warrant litigation and which actions 
should result in settlement.220  To resolve this issue, courts can look to past 
FTC decisions to determine how the deceptive or anticompetitive conduct 
in question should be handled.  Additionally, these amendments will not 
inhibit the FTC from enforcing Section 5 violations; it merely permits 
consumers to do the same.  The FTC will still be a critical agency in 
enforcing the FTC Act, however, consumer protection will be 
strengthened because consumers can assist with enforcement.  Therefore, 
the FTC is still able to use its expertise in stopping Section 5 violators from 
conducting business in the marketplace, and courts can examine how the 
FTC has handled similar cases. 
Critics may also argue that a consumer has little incentive to sue for 
injunctive relief, which is permitted under the proposed amendments.221  
However, consumers will find incentive to file for injunctive relief under 
a private right of action to avoid being harmed in the future, which will 
also strengthen the marketplace for other consumers.  Further, having a 
right of action should be a viable option for consumers if they want to 
enforce consumer protection statutes.222  Thus, beyond the public policy 
concern to protect consumers, there is strong incentive for consumers to 
privately enforce injunctive relief to prevent harmful conduct. 
The current state of consumer protection law requires that an 
amendment be made to Section 5 to ensure that consumers in the United 
States have a private right of action against violators.  Together, the 
                                                 
218 See supra Part II.A (listing the redress that the FTC is entitled to under Section 5 of the 
FTC Act). 
219 See 15 U.S.C. § 45(m) (2012) (listing the statutory amount that the FTC is able to recover 
from a violation of the Section 5). 
220 See Holloway v. Bristol-Myers Corp., 485 F.2d 986, 997 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (noting that the 
FTC has special expertise in determining what causes injury to consumers and the 
competitive system, and if the benefit of stopping the practice outweighs the cost).  Holloway 
also noted that the FTC has special expertise in enforcing deceptive or anticompetitive trade 
practices, and thus, private litigants should not be able to enforce the statute.  Id. 
221 See Toward Greater Equality, supra note 67, at 1624 (discussing UDTPA laws).  Individual 
consumers have little incentive to sue for injunctive relief because they are unlikely to be 
injured by the same deceptive or unfair act or practice twice.  Id. 
222 See supra Part III.C (examining the current state of FTC enforcement and how the FTC 
has been unable to keep up with the amount of consumers complaints that it receives, and 
by having a private right of action, consumers would be able to assist in enforcing consumer 
protection laws). 
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proceeding amendments would effectively provide consumers with 
appropriate redress from being harmed by a scam practice.223  The 
differences between federal and state consumer protection law mandate 
that the legislature take steps to govern both similarly.224 
V.  CONCLUSION 
Courts have failed to recognize the importance of having a private 
right of action under Section 5, preventing consumers from obtaining 
appropriate redress.225  In addition, while the FTC Act protects consumers, 
its protections do not extend to private enforcement of Section 5.226  The 
current consumer protection legislation fails to provide consumers with 
effective redress, and thus, the legislature should amend the current 
language of FTC Act, which will allow for an express private right of 
action, ultimately resulting in stronger consumer protection.227 
Returning to Allison’s situation, if a private right of action were 
available under Section 5, she would be able to recover the money that she 
paid to the telemarketer.228  Even more, Allison would be able to have an 
injunction issued against the telemarketing company—an option that is 
not provided to her under her state consumer law.  This option would 
prevent other victims from falling prey to this particular company’s 
fraudulent scheme.  This Note establishes the importance of creating a 
private right of action under Section 5 for consumers who are placed in a 
similar situation as Allison.229  The proposed amendment would resolve 
the current discrepancies between state and federal consumer protection 
law and create the opportunity to properly compensate consumers who 
are harmed by a Section 5 violation.230  Finally, implementing the 
proposed amendment would result in fulfilling an empty promise made 
to consumers by Congress for stronger consumer protection.231  Thus, the 
                                                 
223 See supra Part IV.A (suggesting a way to amend Section 5 of the FTC Act in order to 
create an express private right to action for consumers). 
224 See supra Part III.A (analogizing the differences between state and federal consumer 
protection laws). 
225 See supra Part II.C (describing the reluctance of courts to imply a private right of action 
under the FTC Act). 
226 See supra Part II.A (listing current enforcement methods of the FTC Act). 
227 See supra Part IV.A (proposing an amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 45 (2012)). 
228  See supra Part I (introducing a common scheme in violation of Section 5 that affects 
Americans regularly). 
229 See supra Part III.A (examining the differences between state and federal consumer 
protection law). 
230 See supra Part IV (suggesting an amendment to 15 U.S.C. § 45). 
231 See Guernsey v. Rich Plan of the Midwest, 408 F. Supp. 582, 588 (N.D. Ind. 1976) 
(arguing that because the FTC had already issued a cease and desist letter to the defendants 
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legislature should enact the proposed amendments to Section 5 of the FTC 
Act, and ensure that individuals like Allison have the opportunity to have 
a private right of action against scams.232 
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for violating the FTC Act, then the conclusion is inescapable that the FTC Act, as enforced by 
the FTC, is an empty promise to consumers). 
232 See supra Part IV (proposing an amendment to Section 5 of the FTC Act). 
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